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INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of March 28, 2016, several employees of MedStar 
Health (“MedStar”), a nonprofit hospital system with ten hospitals in 
                                                     
* Deborah R. Farringer is an Assistant Professor of Law at Belmont University College of Law in 
Nashville, TN. J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A., University of San Diego. I would like 
to thank my research assistants Kim Macdonald and Grace Ann Miller for their work and help in 
bringing this article to fruition. Thanks also to Carinne Jaeger, Megan Livres, and all of the editorial 
staff of Seattle University Law Review for their very helpful suggestions and edits to this article. 
Finally, thank you to my husband and children for their patience with me through this process. 
938 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:937 
Maryland and Washington, D.C.1 were greeted with a pop-up message 
stating: “You just have 10 days to send us the Bitcoin . . . [A]fter 10 days 
we will remove your private key and it’s impossible to recover your files.”2 
The demand was 45 bitcoin,3 which is equivalent to approximately 
$19,000.4 If the hospital paid the bitcoin ransom, the hackers claimed they 
would provide the necessary information to enable MedStar to regain 
access to its system.5 Consistent with recommendations from federal 
officials, it appears that MedStar chose not to pay the bitcoin ransom.6 
Without its electronic health records (“EHR”) system, MedStar was forced 
to shut down its email and computers for all of its ten hospitals and its 
approximately 250 outpatient centers.7 The ramifications went beyond 
simply shutting down email and computers, however. While the 
                                                     
 1. Our Locations, MEDSTAR HEALTH (May 18, 2016), http://www.medstarhealth.org/mhs/our-
locations/#q={}[https://perma.cc/RBG3-9HXL]. 
 2. John Woodrow Cox, MedStar Health Turns Away Patients After Likely Ransomware 
Cyberattack, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/medstar-health-
turns-away-patients-one-day-after-cyberattack-on-its-computers/2016/03/29/252626ae-f5bc-11e5-
a3ce-f06b5ba21f33_story.html [https://perma.cc/9GY8-H3YX] (citing to note appearing on computer 
screens of employees sent by malware hackers). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Bitcoin is an online currency created in 2009, by an individual referred to as Satoshi 
Nakamoto, which is thought to be an alias. See Tal Yellin, et al., What is a Bitcoin,  
CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/infographic/technology/what-is-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8C3M-U4LM]; see also Chad Bray, Australian Ends Attempt to Prove He Founded Bitcoin,  
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/business/dealbook/ 
australian-ends-attempt-to-prove-he-founded-bitcoin.html?_r=0 (reporting that the mystery of the 
inventor of Bitcoin remains after Craig Steven Wright admitted that he was not, in fact, the inventor, 
contrary to his own previous assertions and articles in Wired and Gizmodo in 2015 that identified 
Wright as Nakamoto). The intention behind the currency is that the transacting parties can exchange 
the currency directly without a bank or any other third party transacting agent (as would be the case 
with credit cards, which often have associated credit card fees). Yellin, supra. Bitcoins can be 
purchased on a bitcoin exchange, which allows individuals to either buy or sell bitcoin using various 
currencies (dollars, euros, pounds, etc.). Id. One of the features of a bitcoin exchange is that the names 
of the individual buyers and sellers are not revealed. Rather, the transaction is logged as being between 
wallet IDs. Id. This anonymity makes it difficult to ever trace the wallet ID back to the buyer or seller, 
and thus, Bitcoin has become a popular vehicle for purchasing drugs or other illicit activities online. 
Id. 
 5. Cox, supra note 2. 
 6. See Rachael King, FBI Cyber Division Chief Advises Companies Not to Pay Ransom for 
Release of Data, WALL ST. J.: CIO J. (May 4, 2016, 1:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
cio/2016/05/04/fbi-cyber-division-chief-advises-companies-not-to-pay-ransom-for-release-of-data/ 
[https://perma.cc/25MY-L4XX]. See Mark Hagland, The Cyberattack on the 10-Hospital MedStar 
Health Poses Several Important Questions to Patient Care Leaders, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS  
(Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/blogs/mark-hagland/so-it-was-ransomware-
implications-attack-medstar-health [https://perma.cc/NDM8-3F2Z] (“A bitcoin tracking site reports 
that no funds have been transferred in or out of [the online ‘wallet’ that MedStar was directed to in 
order to pay the ransom demand].”). 
 7. Cox, supra note 2. 
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emergency department in MedStar’s Washington, D.C. hospital stayed 
open during the outage, the challenges with triaging and treating patients 
utilizing a back-up paper system eventually led to diversion of patients 
with life-threatening conditions to other area hospitals.8 Moreover, many 
of MedStar’s outpatient clinics were forced to cancel appointments 
entirely, as some were unable to provide treatment or other routine office 
management functions, such as check-in, billing, and collection, without 
their computer system in operation.9 Beyond the inconveniences of slow 
response time and rescheduling of certain outpatient appointments, lack of 
access to the EHR system created patient care concerns and potential 
safety risks.10 For example, a nurse reported to The Washington Post that, 
because of delayed lab results, she continued to give certain medication—
“with a number of potentially serious side effects”—to a patient whose 
medication should have been discontinued eight hours earlier.11 While 
MedStar executives tried to remain positive to the public, the narratives 
from patients, providers, and staff about the challenges presented with this 
sort of attack revealed a different story.12 
While a malware attack like this may be a mere annoyance or 
inconvenience for some businesses, the challenges presented to healthcare 
providers in this context can be much more devastating.13 Unfortunately, 
stories like that of MedStar are not isolated. Within weeks of the MedStar 
attack, there were reports of attacks on one hospital in Kentucky, two 
                                                     
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. (noting that a man receiving cancer treatment was unable to receive radiation treatment 
for two days because of the shutdown). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. (“Without access to email and computer systems, the medical staff fell back on  
seldom-used paper records . . . [which] are far less comprehensive than those kept in digital form. 
They can be missing vital pieces of patient information . . . .”). See also Jürgen Stausberg, et al., 
Comparing Paper-based with Electronic Paper Records: Lessons Learned during a Study on 
Diagnosis and Procedure Codes, 10 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 470 (Sept./Oct. 2003), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC212784/ [https://perma.cc/MT7J-6D6T] (noting that 
often times the electronic record contains distinct data and finding that “parallel use of electronic and 
paper-based patient records result[ed] in inconsistencies between the record systems’ and 
‘documentation [was] missing in both.”). 
 13. See Naomi Lachance, Malware Attacks on Hospitals Put Patients At Risk, NASHVILLE PUB. 
RADIO (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/01/472693703/ 
malware-attacks-on-hospitals-put-patients-at-risk [https://perma.cc/42YJ-VJNR] (quoting Kevin Fu, 
Associate Professor at the University of Michigan, “[t]he big difference with health care is that the 
consequences are greater . . . . You can lose your email and that’s annoying, but patient records are 
needed in order to treat patients.”); Nsikan Akpan, Has Health Care Hacking Become an 
Epidemic?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 23, 2016, 6:19 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/has-
health-care-hacking-become-an-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/3PK6-W9M3] (noting that there are 
fewer protections for health data, but such data is also more valuable because of the amount of 
information that is contained in such records). 
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hospitals in California, one hospital in Kansas, and one hospital in Ottawa, 
Canada.14 Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles, 
California announced that it had paid the 40 bitcoin ransom demand 
(equivalent to about $17,000) in order to regain access to its system.15 
Kansas Heart Hospital, in Wichita, also paid a bitcoin ransom in an effort 
to regain access to its EHR system, but it gained only “partial access” and 
a demand for additional money.16 While hackers and data breaches are not 
new in the healthcare context,17 ransomware attacks18 are unique in the 
way they have a direct and immediate impact on the actual provision of 
care to patients and present a very real threat to patient safety.19 Sadly, the 
potential devastation that could be caused when hospitals and health 
systems lose access to their EHRs and computer systems20 is exactly what 
makes these types of attacks so attractive to potential hackers.21 As these 
attacks are starting to become more commonplace, many are questioning 
how the healthcare industry has become so vulnerable and what can be 
                                                     
 14. Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, Ransomware: Time for a HIPAA Update?, INFORISK TODAY 
(Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.inforisktoday.com/ransomware-time-for-hipaa-a-9002 [https://perma.cc/ 
48KQ-RH8Z]. 
 15. Id.; Richard Winton, Hollywood Hospital Pays $17,000 in Bitcoin to Hackers; FBI 
Investigating, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016, 10:44 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/ 
la-me-ln-hollywood-hospital-bitcoin-20160217-story.html [https://perma.cc/HD2M-QUSH]. 
 16. Justin Pot, Ransomware Attackers Refuse to Decrypt Hospital’s Files After Being Paid Off, 
DIGITAL TRENDS (May 24, 2016, 4:43 PM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/ransomware-
hospital-hackers-demand-more-money/ [https://perma.cc/GL82-N9BC]. 
 17. See Claire Groden, This Big U.S. Health Insurer Just Got Hacked, FORTUNE (Sept. 10, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/09/10/hack-health-insurer-bluecross/ [https://perma.cc/73J8-TZZ2] (noting 
that Excellus BlueCross BlueShield announced that more than ten million of its customers’ 
information—including social security numbers, names, addresses, birthdates, financial information, 
and claims—had been exposed in a cyberattack); Kara Scannell & Gina Chon, Cyber Security: Attack 
of the Health Hackers, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/f3cbda3e-a027-11e5-
8613-08e211ea5317.html#axzz49JER10mJ [https://perma.cc/7ZBE-PQ5Q] (reporting that hackers 
believed to be from China used administrator’s credentials to access health insurer Anthem’s database 
to access personal information such as names, social security numbers, and birthdates of over seventy-
eight million people). 
 18. Ransomware is a type of malware that blocks users from accessing their data until a ransom 
is paid. See Zetter II, infra note 105. 
 19. Unlike cyberattacks intended to access personal data, a cyberattack that prevents access to 
an EHR disrupts the ability of a provider to actually provide care in the same manner. Erin McCann, 
Nurses Want Probe into EMR Failure, HEALTHCAREIT NEWS (Mar. 10, 2015, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/rns-want-investigation-emr-failure [https://perma.cc/6FSM-
FH2E] (noting all of the issues that arose at Antelope Valley Hospital in Lancaster, California when 
its EHR crashed). 
 20. When referring to an EHR, this Article considers not only the records themselves, but the 
“front end” and “back end” system components that permit a provider to schedule patients and also 
bill and process claims for services already provided. 
 21. Andrea Peterson, Why Hackers Are Going After Health-Care Providers, WASH. POST: THE 
SWITCH (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/03/28/why-
hackers-are-going-after-health-care-providers/ [https://perma.cc/6V6H-4MZX]. 
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done to stop the cycle of attacks.22 Despite efforts by the United States 
Congress to increase reporting of cyberattacks23 and efforts by the 
Department of Commerce to increase education and awareness on 
cybersecurity,24 more needs to be done in order to prevent these attacks 
and provide greater protection not just of patient data but also of the EHRs 
and computer systems upon which patients’ lives depend. 
Hospitals and health systems appear uniquely vulnerable to 
ransomware attacks as a result of various factors, including (1) the 
fractured movement toward electronic medical records and (2) the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ lack of emphasis on 
enforcement of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA)25 and the Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act26 with respect to security of electronic 
data. This Article argues that, while stricter and more current federal 
regulations are necessary, the most expedient way to protect against 
immediate attacks will be an industry-driven response demanding 
industry-wide security standards from EHR companies above and beyond 
HIPAA standards. To accomplish such a response, the healthcare industry 
will first have to shift from its current electronic security culture that 
contemplates only the minimum necessary for HIPAA compliance and 
instead push providers to realize that security of EHRs and patient data 
will require time, money, and resources in the same way that providers 
have invested in the latest medical equipment, upgraded facilities, and 
hired innovative and dynamic personnel in order to compete with one 
another. Ideally, this shift will also spur a decrease or consolidation of 
EHR products and offerings—especially those products for specific 
medical specialties and thus, limited in marketability—into only a few 
products that will provide more collaboration, system integration, and 
compatibility among systems. Such consolidation will actually drive 
                                                     
 22. Id.; Akpan, supra note 13; see also DANIEL W. BERGER, REDSPIN’S BREACH REPORT 2015: 
PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION (PHI) 4 (Feb. 2016) (noting that 98.1% of all “records breached 
in 2015 were the result of hacking attacks/IT incidents” and that there was an 897% increase in 
breached records from 2014 to 2015). 
 23. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1510 (2015). 
 24. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, HIPAA SECURITY 
RULE CROSSWALK TO NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, (Feb. 2016), http://www.hhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/NIST%20CSF%20to%20HIPAA%20Security%20Rule%20Crosswalk%2002-22-
2016%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBU8-LJNJ] [hereinafter CROSSWALK]. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg (2010), 1320d (2010); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181 (2011), 1182 (2008), 1183 
(1996). 
 26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj to jj-51 (2016), §§ 17901–17903 (2009); Title XIII (Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, “HITECH”) of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (AARA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (2009) (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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providers closer to the goals envisioned under HIPAA and make security 
of those systems easier and more reliable. 
Part I of this Article describes how the healthcare industry has arrived 
in this place of vulnerability, including (1) the history of the movement 
toward EHRs through HIPAA, (2) HIPAA’s meaningful use regulations 
and the background of current ransomware attacks, and (3) the distinctions 
between these attacks and other security breaches that have plagued large 
insurers and health systems within the last five years. Next, Part II will 
examine current industry culture when it comes to cybersecurity and 
review current legal and business approaches to address this growing 
threat. Then, Part III will argue that, while the current laws—including 
HIPAA and HITECH—are a good start, they do not go far enough to curb 
the current ransomware attacks and thus, should be amended. It will 
further argue that such amendments cannot be the only solution. Rather, 
the healthcare industry has to spur its own movement toward better and 
tighter security over its healthcare technology. Lastly, this Article will 
conclude with some suggestions and recommendations for how industry 
and government regulators can work together to assure that hospitals and 
health systems are not faced with the dilemma of having to choose 
between patient safety and the payment of a bitcoin ransom. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Origins of HIPAA and the Emergence of Electronic Medical Records 
When HIPAA was first enacted in 1996,27 its objectives were  
two-fold: (1) assure that individuals could maintain health insurance 
between jobs; and (2) protect the privacy and confidentiality of patient data 
as the healthcare industry moved toward electronic transmission of patient 
data.28 Although HIPAA was first enacted in 1996, it was not until 2003 
that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) first enacted 
regulations addressing privacy (known as the “Privacy Rule”)29 and 
security of protected health information (known as the “Security Rule”).30 
Though HIPAA was intended to move providers toward utilization of 
                                                     
 27. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, H.R. 3103, 104th Cong. (1996) 
(enacted). 
 28. Id. Note that the first goal of HIPAA was implemented relatively easily, creating the COBRA 
program that enables individuals to maintain coverage for a period of eighteen months following 
termination of any job. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS 750–51 (7th ed. 2013). 
 29. The Privacy Rule and Security Rule are combined in the HIPAA Administrative 
Simplification Regulations. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160 (2014), 162 (2011), 164 (2013). 
 30. Id. 
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EHRs,31 at first the law did little to actually change the practices of many 
providers to move away from paper records systems.32 As Dr. David 
Blumenthal of the U.S. Office of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology (ONC) noted in 2010: “We have years of 
professional agreement and bipartisan consensus regarding the potential 
value of EHRs. Yet we have not moved significantly to extend the 
availability of EHRs from a few large institutions to the smaller clinics and 
practices where most Americans receive their health care.”33 Indeed, a 
report from the ONC found that, by 2008, only 9.4% of hospitals had a 
basic EHR system.34 While widely believed to help mend some of the 
fragmentation of the current U.S. healthcare system and provide better 
patient outcomes through enhanced communication and care coordination, 
hospitals and other practitioners were slow to adopt new technology.35 
Even acknowledging the benefits, implementation of an EHR system 
requires capital investment in new equipment and software, training time 
for staff, redesigning of clinical processes and workflow, disruption of 
billing and collection, and new compliance requirements.36 Thus, 
implementation of an EHR system is neither an easy nor inexpensive 
proposition for providers.37 While providers may adjust over time, it has 
been reported that EHRs “can potentially decrease individual provider 
                                                     
 31. Following the enactment of HIPAA, the George W. Bush Administration began pushing 
healthcare providers toward a national EHR, stating in 2004 that it had a ten-year goal that the U.S. 
implement a national EHR by 2014. See Nicolas P. Terry, Certification and Meaningful Use: 
Reframing Adoption of Electronic Health Records as a Quality Imperative, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 
43, 48 (2011) (citing White House Off. of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Transforming Health Care for 
All Americans (May 27, 2004), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 
2004/05/20040527-2.html). 
 32. JAWANNA HENRY ET AL., ADOPTION OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEMS AMONG 
U.S. NON-FEDERAL ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS: 2008-2015, 35 ONC DATA BRIEF 1, (May 2016), 
https://dashboard.healthit.gov/evaluations/data-briefs/non-federal-acute-care-hospital-ehr-adoption-
2008-2015.php [https://perma.cc/ZA52-QTNE]. 
 33. David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner, The “Meaningful Use” Regulation for Electronic 
Health Records, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 501 (2010). 
 34. HENRY ET AL., supra note 32. 
 35. Id.; Nir Menachemi & Taleah H. Collum, Benefits and Drawbacks of Electronic  
Health Record Systems, RISK MGMT. & HEALTHCARE POL’Y 47 (May 11, 2011), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3270933/pdf/rmhp-4-047.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
68WG-LTM9] (noting that electronic health records have the ability to revolutionize the healthcare 
industry, but noting the functional, financial, productivity, and privacy and security concerns). 
 36. Agency for Healthcare Res. & Quality, Electronic Medical Record Systems, HEALTH INFO. 
TECH., https://healthit.ahrq.gov/key-topics/electronic-medical-record-systems [https://perma.cc/ 
S2BJ-XTBM] (citing various barriers to adoption of an EHR, including “[h]igh capital cost and 
insufficient return on investment for small practices and safety net providers[, u]nderestimation of the 
organizational capabilities and change management required[, and f]ailure to redesign clinical process 
and workflow to incorporate the technology systems”). 
 37. See id.; see also Menachemi & Collum, supra note 35, at 51. 
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productivity by 10%” and can add additional costs for maintenance of the 
system as well as storage of the data on a long-term basis.38 Knowing that 
spurring providers (especially smaller providers) into implementing an 
EHR would be a challenge, HHS tried other incentives prior to enactment 
of HITECH to push providers toward use of electronic records.39 HHS 
created a safe harbor under the federal Anti-kickback Statute and an 
exception to the Physician Self-Referral Law (otherwise known as the 
Stark Law) that would permit hospitals to provide certain hardware and 
software to referring physicians to adopt an EHR system or to enable 
physician practices to have e-prescribing capabilities.40 Additional 
funding was given to states for the establishment of regional health 
information exchanges (RHIOs),41 designed to encourage providers in a 
particular region to share medical information in a central location (or 
“vault”) enabling other providers to access the data as patients seek care 
from various providers in the region.42 Since enactment of HITECH, there 
have been additional (albeit distinct) efforts43 toward other medical 
                                                     
 38. Dean F. Sittig & Hardeep Singh, Legal, Ethical, and Financial Dilemmas in Electronic 
Health Record Adoption and Use, 127 PEDIATRICS e1042, e1045 (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3065078/ [https://perma.cc/3ART-QXJU] (noting 
further that many providers are concerned about cost, given the ongoing expense, offset by the fact 
that an estimated 89% of the monetary benefits of an EHR actually inures to health insurers (or 
payors)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(x), (y) (2017); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(v), (w) (2017). 
 41. The primary goals of RHIOs are to enable better patient care through a reduction in 
overtreatment and duplicative care enabled through access to information among providers. Julia 
Adler-Milstein et al., The State of Regional Health Information Organizations: Current Activities and 
Financing, 27 HEALTH AFFS. 60, 61 (2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/1/ 
w60.full.pdf+html [https://perma.cc/J5KA-97BM]. 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-31(a)(1) (2009) (directing the Secretary of HHS to invest in infrastructure 
necessary to support “health information technology architecture that will support the nationwide 
electronic exchange and use of health information in a secure, private, and accurate manner, including 
connecting health information exchanges ”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-31(a)(2)–(7) (2009) (HITECH 
also provided funding for the Secretary of HHS to support “(2) [d]evelopment and adoption of 
appropriate certified electronic health records for categories of health care providers not eligible for 
support under title XVIII or XIX of the Social Security Act . . . for the adoption of such records[;] (3) 
[t]raining on and dissemination of information on best practices to integrate health information 
technology, including electronic health records, into a provider’s delivery of care . . . [;] (4) 
[i]nfrastructure and tools for the promotion of telemedicine . . . [;] (6) [p]romotion of technologies and 
best practices that enhance the protection of health information by all holders of individually 
identifiable health information [; and] (7) [i]mprovement and expansion of the use of health 
information technology by public health departments.”). 
 43. Despite some initial excitement around RHIOs, the majority of the projects have been largely 
abandoned due to a variety of factors, including complex and detailed regulations and movement 
toward other collaboration and consolidation efforts. See Joshua M. Liao & Danny Chu, The State of 
Health Information Exchange, 3 J. HEALTH MED. INFO. 1 (2012), http://www.omicsonline.org/the-
state-of-health-information-exchange-2157-7420.1000e102.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BL9-M8JC]. 
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records integration. The most impactful effort is perhaps the creation of 
accountable care organizations (ACOs) under the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), which requires clinical integration that can be accomplished 
through coordination and/or consolidation of EHRs.44 None of the efforts, 
however, have been able to fulfill HIPAA’s stated goals regarding better 
communication among providers. Rather, to date, the principal effort has 
been simply moving providers toward adoption of any electronic records 
system.45 
It was this slow response by providers and seemingly stagnant 
approach to EHR adoption that spurred enactment of the HITECH Act in 
2009.46 HITECH’s “meaningful use” standards directed hospitals and 
other health care providers not only to possess a “certified EHR” system47 
but also to “meaningfully use” health information technology.48 
Demonstration of “meaningful use” under the regulations requires the 
provider to meet “certain measurement thresholds that range from 
recording patient information as structured data to exchanging summary 
care records.”49 These measurements are established in three different 
stages.50 In an effort to assure compliance, HHS utilized funding 
appropriated by Congress to enact regulations to encourage and promote 
                                                     
 44. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2016); see also Statement 
of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026, 67027 (Oct. 28, 2011). 
 45. The first set of regulations for Stage 1 was published in 2010. See 75 Fed. Reg. 44,314 (July 
28, 2010).The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has subsequently issued 
regulations for Stage 2. See 77 Fed. Reg. 53,968 (Sept. 4, 2012). For Stage 3, see 80 Fed. Reg. 16,732 
(Mar. 30, 2015). 
 46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj to jj-51 (2016). 
 47. The ONC has officially removed the definition of certified EHR technology from its 
definitions, but generally defines it as an EHR that supports the EHR Incentive Programs, as set forth 
in the EHR Incentive Programs regulations. See Off. of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., 
Certified EHR Technology Definition, HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-
implementers/certified-ehr-technology-definition [https://perma.cc/D3KY-VEMB]. 
 48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj to jj-51. 
 49. Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Meaningful Use  
Regulations, HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/meaningful-
use- regulations [https://perma.cc/Z33K-E9NB]. 
 50. Id. One of the primary goals of the meaningful use requirements was to assure that not only 
did providers purchase an EHR but also that they purchase one that is more than simply an electronic 
filing system in which all paper records are simply stored online in PDF format. This is evident from 
the various stages of the meaningful use regulations. Once providers adopted an EHR under Stage 1, 
they move to Stage 2, which “encouraged the use of health IT for continuous quality improvement at 
the point of care and the exchange of information in the most structured format possible.” Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Electronic Health Records (EHR) Incentive Programs, CMS.GOV, 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/index.html? 
redirect=/ehrincentiveprograms [https://perma.cc/8SGP-C8H6] (emphasis added). 
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adoption of EHRs through a “carrot and stick” approach.51 In doing so, 
HHS initially encouraged adoption and use of EHRs through financial 
incentives to providers52 but, after four years, began assessing penalties 
for any providers who failed to adopt and use EHRs.53 
The incentives and penalties seem to have accomplished at least 
some of HITECH’s intended goals. By 2015, 96% of all non-federal acute 
care hospitals possessed a certified EHR system, with 84% of those 
hospitals adopting a basic EHR system.54 While it certainly spurred 
providers to finally purchase, and in some cases adopt, an EHR system,55 
this rapid ascent into EHR adoption seems to have caused some 
unintended consequences.56 As one author has noted, 
Unlike other sectors that implemented IT naturally and gradually 
over the course of many years, health care went digital overnight, 
after the government allocated billions of dollars to promote adoption 
of electronic health care records . . . . This explosive growth rate is 
alarming and indicates that health care entities could not have the 
organizational readiness for adopting information technologies over 
such short period of time.57 
In addition to challenges with organizational readiness, the almost 
instantaneous demand for EHRs, without emphasis or requirement in the 
regulations for any compatibility between systems, has resulted in a lack 
of interoperability between health information technologies among 
providers both regionally and across the country.58 Indeed, initial HITECH 
                                                     
 51. Roger Hsieh, Improving HIPAA Enforcement and Protecting Patient Privacy in a Digital 
Healthcare Environment, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 175, 181 (2014). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(o) (2016). 
 53. Samantha Burch, Meaningful Use—Stage 3 Coming, Stages 1 and 2 Compliance, 20150325 
AHLA SEMINAR PAPERS 9 (Mar. 25, 2015); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4. 
 54. HENRY ET AL., supra note 32. This information is based on non-federal acute care hospitals. 
A basic EHR system is defined as a system that has a “minimum use of 10 core functionalities 
determined to be essential to an EHR system.” Id. As noted above, a certified EHR is an EHR that has 
technology certified to meet federal requirements. The importance of this distinction is that while 
nearly 97% of hospitals possessed an EHR that meets minimum requirements under federal 
regulations, only about 76% of hospitals had implemented and were using a basic EHR in 2014. Id. 
The statistics were largely unchanged for reporting year 2015. 
 55. While many providers purchased an EHR, not all providers actually began using it or adopted 
its use as contemplated by the meaningful use regulations. See Niam Yaraghi, A Health Hack Wake-
Up Call, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 1, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/ 
policy-dose/articles/2016-04-01/ransomware-hacks-are-a-hospital-health-it-wake-up-call 
[https://perma.cc/66YG-LD8E]. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. George Palma, Electronic Health Records: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, BECKER’S 
HEALTH IT & CIO REV. (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-
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regulations focused on providers’ use of an electronic system in an attempt 
to transition providers away from paper records and also away from 
purchasing systems that effectively provided an online electronic record 
filing system.59 As Stage 1 focused on getting hospitals to adopt EHRs, 
later Stages 2 and 3 of the HITECH program shifted to incorporation of 
some health information exchange (such as orders and tests), greater 
patient interaction and access to one’s own health system, transitions in 
care, decision support, and improving population health outcomes.60 
Despite the newfound accessibility the EHR provides, few metrics or 
measurements focus on an ability to communicate health information 
across various spectrums of care.61 Although there may be additional goals 
in the coming years,62 thus far the regulations have not focused on the 
coordination of those EHR systems among providers, that is, the ability of 
various EHR systems to “talk” to one another.63 Contrary to some of the 
                                                     
information-technology/electronic-health-records-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly.html 
[https://perma.cc/RJD6-7E26] (stating that sharing information within networks of referring hospitals 
is frequently not possible, as may providers are unwilling to open the lines of communication and little 
planning for integration is being put into place). 
 59. Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,314, 44,321 (July 28, 2010). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 44321–22. Stage 1 of the program, effective in 2011, was for the purpose of data capture 
and sharing; Stage 2, effective in 2014, was for the purpose of advancing clinical processes, and Stage 
3, effective in 2016, was for the purpose of improved outcomes. See Office of the Nat’l Coordinator 
for Health Info. Tech., Meaningful Use Definition & Objectives, HEALTHIT.GOV, 
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/meaningful-use-definition-objectives 
[https://perma.cc/JLE5-JKFR]. 
 62. It should be acknowledged here that part of the reason that RHIOs and other efforts regarding 
interoperability have remained relatively stagnant is the simultaneous efforts under the Affordable 
Care Act of 2010 (ACA) to create accountable care organizations (ACOs). See Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2016). ACOs, defined as “groups of doctors and other health 
care providers who voluntarily work together with Medicare to give high quality service to Medicare 
Fee-for-Service beneficiaries,” contemplate clinical integration in order to meet federal requirements, 
including requirements set forth by the Federal Trade Commission, regarding these sorts of activities. 
See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Shared  
Savings Program, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-For-ServicePayment/ 
sharedsavingsprogram/index.html [https://perma.cc/2AWB-GLBE]; State of Antitrust Enforcement 
Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,027 (Oct. 28, 2011). Because quality metric reporting and clinical 
integration typically requires sharing of data, one of the goals of ACOs is to create this interoperability 
or data sharing between providers. Thus, as the provisions of the ACA are now being implemented 
and ACOs and other initiatives such as value-based purchasing push providers toward integration, 
many are waiting to see whether interoperability will come about as a result of these other efforts 
toward integration and payment reform. See Joseph Conn, Interoperability Hurdles Impede ACOs, 
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160120/NEWS/ 
160129991 [https://perma.cc/4RAG-TSRB]. 
 63. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAD-15-817, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS: 
NONFEDERAL EFFORTS TO HELP ACHIEVE HEALTH INFORMATION INTEROPERABILITY, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672585.pdf [https://perma.cc/F67Y-8MZG] (noting five key 
948 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:937 
initial intentions of HIPAA to utilize EHRs for the purpose of sharing data 
among providers across the continuum of care, the focus under HITECH 
seems to be driven by the goals of compliance and reporting.64 
Just as the regulations have not focused on interoperability, there has 
been little emphasis on a need to update, revise, or reevaluate the security 
regulations drafted under HIPAA.65 Even with enactment of HITECH, 
there have been no updates or amendments to the security regulations 
issued under HIPAA since it was finalized in 2003.66 Many critics feel that 
the security provisions are already many years out of date and, as a 
consequence, do little to actually protect data as necessary to account for 
the current state of cybersecurity.67 CynergisTek, Inc.68 co-founder and 
CEO Mac McMillan has stated, 
We’re behind . . . [b]asically what we really need to do is scrap the 
HIPAA Security Rule and just let organizations select the framework 
that they want to work with, whether it’s [National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST)], whether it’s [International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO)], but a legitimate framework. 
From there, they build their program and we hold them accountable 
for protecting the data. . . . The problem is that HIPAA is 
antiquated . . . It’s behind the times and we need to take a new 
approach.69 
                                                     
challenges in achieving EHR-interoperability: “(1) insufficiencies in health data standards, (2) 
variation in state privacy rules, (3) accurately matching patients’ health records, (4) costs associated 
with interoperability, and (5) the need for governance and trust among entities, such as agreements to 
facilitate the sharing of information among all participants in an initiative.”); see also Fred Pennic, 4 
Challenges of Establishing EHR Interoperability, HIT CONSULTANT (Oct. 2, 2015), 
http://hitconsultant.net/2015/10/02/4-challenges-of-establishing-ehr-interoperability/ 
[https://perma.cc/AG9Q-D9GJ]. 
 64. Hsieh, supra note 51, at 189. It must be acknowledged that there are some provisions under 
the HITECH regulations that attempt to address the capabilities of an EHR to communicate 
electronically with other electronic systems. For example, HITECH requires that the EHR have the 
ability to e-prescribe so that prescriptions can be sent electronically to a pharmacy. 45 C.F.R. 
§ 170.314(b)(3) (2016). 
 65. See Hsieh, supra note 51, at 190. 
 66. Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334 (Feb. 20, 2003). 
For information regarding any guidance and lack of updates since enactment of the final rule, see 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Office for Civil Rights, The Security Rule, HHS.GOV, 
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/ [https://perma.cc/U8SF-HEAM]. 
 67. Elizabeth Snell, Is the HIPAA Security Rule Doing Enough for Healthcare?, 
HEALTHITSECURITY (Apr. 22, 2015), http://healthitsecurity.com/news/is-the-hipaa-security-rule-
doing-enough-for-healthcare [https://perma.cc/UVD3-3HEX]. 
 68. Cynergistek, Inc. is a healthcare IT company providing security, privacy, compliance and 
audit, and management services for entities in the healthcare industry. See generally CYNERGISTEK, 
INC., http://cynergistek.com/ [https://perma.cc/QD42-72C2]. 
 69. See Snell, supra note 67. “NIST” stands for the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, and “ISO” stands for the International Organization for Standardization. Id. 
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Although the HIPAA security standards have not been updated since 
2003, the government has consistently updated standards from the NIST 
with respect to cybersecurity and recently created a “crosswalk”70 between 
the NIST guidance and HIPAA security regulations.71 The NIST, now part 
of the U.S. Department of Commerce, was founded in 1901 to “remove a 
major challenge to U.S. industrial competitiveness at the time—a  
second-rate measurement infrastructure that lagged behind the capabilities 
of the United Kingdom, Germany, and other economic rivals.”72 Today, 
the NIST’s measurements support all sizes and forms of technologies, 
including cybersecurity.73 In February of 2014, the NIST released its 
Framework for Improving Clinical Infrastructure Cybersecurity pursuant 
to an Executive Order.74 The framework was intended “to help 
organizations in any industry to understand, communicate, and manage 
cybersecurity risks.”75 Because HIPAA has its own set of regulations 
regarding security of electronic health information, the goal is to identify 
potential gaps between HIPAA regulations and NIST guidance so that 
covered entities under HIPAA76 can examine their own security programs 
and incorporate some of the NIST recommendations into their risk 
management programs.77 The NIST is quick to point out, however, that its 
guidelines should not lead a provider to assume that such security 
provisions will necessarily be HIPAA compliant78 or that any provider is 
required to abide by the guidelines.79 Rather, the “crosswalk” should be 
seen as a sort of best practice that can provide guidance on supplementing 
the security regulations under HIPAA.80 
                                                     
 70. A “crosswalk” is a term used to “describe a mechanism or approach to translating, comparing 
or moving between meta data standards . . . or converting skills or content from one discipline to 
another,” which in this instance means a mechanism for translating or comparing the HIPAA 
regulations to the NIST data standards. See Karen Gross, Crosswalks, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. OFF. OF 
THE UNDER SECRETARY (May 1, 2012), https://sites.ed.gov/ous/2012/05/crosswalks/ 
[https://perma.cc/H2DKZFEH] (internal citation omitted). 
 71. CROSSWALK, supra note 24. 
 72. Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., Public Affairs Office, About NIST, NIST.GOV, 
https://www.nist.gov/about-nist [https://perma.cc/E55D-KTKR]. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See CROSSWALK, supra note 24, at 1 (citing Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11739 
(Feb. 12, 2013)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014). 
 77. CROSSWALK, supra note 24, at 1. 
 78. Id. at 2 (stating that the mappings are “intended to be an informative reference and do not 
imply or guarantee compliance with any laws or regulations”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Addressing Gaps in Cybersecurity: OCR 
Releases Crosswalk Between HIPAA Security Rule and NIST Cybersecurity Framework, HHS.GOV, 
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In addition to the NIST guidance, HHS also issued guidance in July 
of 2016 in the form of a Q&A Fact Sheet (“Fact Sheet”) for the specific 
purpose of describing “ransomware attack prevention and recovery from 
a healthcare sector perspective, including the role . . . HIPAA . . . has in 
assisting HIPAA covered entities and business associates to prevent and 
recover from ransomware attacks, and how HIPAA breach notification 
processes should be managed in response to a ransomware attack.”81 
Noting that there has been a 300% increase in reported ransomware attacks 
since 2015, the Fact Sheet asks and answers eight questions ranging from 
explanations of ransomware itself to helping HIPAA covered entities 
understand how to undertake an analysis as to whether an attack 
constitutes a breach under HIPAA.82 HHS states in the guidance that the 
Security Rule does contain some requirements that may “help prevent 
introduction of malware, including ransomware,”83 but concedes that the 
Security Rule simply sets forth minimum requirements and recommends 
that entities implement more rigorous standards for purposes of securing 
Protected Health Information (PHI).84 One of HHS’ aims in releasing the 
Fact Sheet is to answer lingering questions regarding how such attacks 
should be characterized under HIPAA.85 HHS makes clear that such 
attacks constitute a “security incident” under the Security Rules, thus 
initiating the security incident response and reporting procedures.86 
Whether ransomware attacks constitute a breach under HIPAA’s Privacy 
Rule, however, is based upon the facts of a particular incident, according 
to HHS.87 HHS recognizes that in many instances of ransomware attacks, 
the particular victim may be unable to determine while the system was 
being held captive if such data was accessed and may require an analysis 
                                                     
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/nist-security-hipaa-crosswalk/index.html? 
language =es [https://perma.cc/3XD6-BDDH]. 
 81. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Fact Sheet: Ransomware and HIPAA, HHS.GOV (July 
11, 2016), http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/RansomwareFactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8YL-
4K6Q] [hereinafter Ransomware Fact Sheet]. 
 82. Id. at 1. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1–2. See also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014) (“Protected Health Information” is defined 
as “(1) individually identifiable health information that is: (i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii) 
Maintained in electronic media; (iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium. (2) 
Protected health information excludes individually identifiable health information: (i) In education 
records covered by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii) 
In records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); (iii) In employment records held by a covered 
entity in its role as employer; and (iv) Regarding a person who has been decreased for more than 50 
years.”).   
 85. Ransomware Fact Sheet, supra note 81, at 4–7. 
 86. Id. at 4. 
 87. Id. 
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of the particular malware algorithm to really understand whether any data 
was accessed.88 Ultimately, HHS advises providers that they will have to 
undertake the same analysis in determining whether the breach, based on 
its specific facts, is reportable as a breach to those affected.89 
B. Ransomware Attacks 
Although the government has taken some measures to assure security 
of EHRs, over the past five or six years a number of factors have led to an 
environment in which these security breaches have become increasingly 
common. Certainly, data breaches and security concerns are not new in the 
healthcare industry.90 Since HIPAA regulations first went into effect in 
2003, there have been multiple reports of breaches, although until recently 
most breaches have been small-scale, such as stolen or lost laptops.91 
Within the last two to three years, however, smaller breaches have 
morphed into larger-scale HIPAA breaches, such as hackers infiltrating 
the networks of large health systems and insurers.92 According to an HHS 
database maintained for breaches affecting more than 500 individuals, 
there have been 193 reported incidences of breaches as a result of 
“hacking/IT incident” since 2009, at least nine of which affected more than 
one million individuals.93 Such breaches have included a hack into a 
database of almost 80 million personal consumer records at Anthem Inc., 
a large health insurer,94 and a hack affecting the personal data of more than 
4.5 million patients into Community Health System, a publicly traded 
hospital company with more than 200 hospitals in twenty-nine states at the 
                                                     
 88. Id. at 6. 
 89. See generally id. 
 90. See Scannell & Chon, supra note 17. 
 91. Cindy Gallee, The Importance of Data Encryption and Security Rules: Breaches of 
Electronic Protected Health Information Under HIPAA and HITECH, 26 DCBA BRIEF 16, 18 (June 
2014). 
 92. See Scannell & Chon, supra note 17. This is not to imply that small-scale breaches have 
ceased. On the contrary, there have been more than eighty breaches affecting more than 500 
individuals in the first six months of 2016 for breaches unrelated to hackers or other IT incidents. See 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Office for Civil Rights, Breaches Affecting 500 or  
More Individuals, HHS.GOV, https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf;jsessionid= 
78DDA9A0C78B25921265CE8E312BC929.worker1 [https://perma.cc/YC6D-K6AJ] (based on a 
review of all breaches reported since 2009). 
 93. Id. (based on review of breaches in excess of one million individuals as a result of 
“hacking/IT incident”). 
 94. Andrea Peterson, 2015 is Already the Year of the Health-Care Hack—and It’s Only Going 
to Get Worse, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/03/20/2015-is-already-the-year-of-the-health-care-hack-and-its-only-going-to-get-
worse/?utm_term=.ed5999920f0c [https://perma.cc/5LFM-RCPQ]. 
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time of the incident.95 In contrast to ransomware attacks, which seem 
focused on cutting off access to an electronic system, it appears that these 
large-scale hacks are for the purpose of obtaining the personal information 
contained within the records.96 Based on the investigations of these 
attacks, the hackers appear to be accessing personal information on 
patients and insureds, such as names, addresses, birthdates, telephone 
numbers, and social security numbers. Significantly, not all attacks have 
accessed financial or medical information.97 
Observers have identified two possible reasons for these attacks.98 
First, the data that is being accessed is the type of data frequently targeted 
by criminals who then sell the “hacked” data on the black market.99 Much 
of the same information that can be obtained by accessing credit card 
information is accessible through medical records, but use of medical data 
by identity thieves is much more difficult to detect than data obtained 
through credit card theft.100 Many of the large-scale data breaches have 
been traced back to individuals in China,101 and some theorists speculate 
that the hackers could be working on behalf of the Chinese government in 
                                                     
 95. Beth Kutscher & Joseph Conn, Chinese Hackers Hit Community Health Systems; Others 
Vulnerable, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/ 
20140818/NEWS/308189946 [https://perma.cc/VV23-Y5B4]. Note that since the breach incident in 
2014, Community Health Systems has sold off some of its hospitals, and at the time of this Article, it 
owned and operated 158 hospitals in twenty-two states. See Locations, COMMUNITY HEALTH SYS., 
http://www.chs.net/serving-communities/locations/ [https://perma.cc/F8SC-6ZV4]. 
 96. See Ransomware Fact Sheet, supra note 81 (defining ransomware’s defining characteristic 
to be that it “attempts to deny access to a user’s data, usually by encrypting the data with a key known 
only to the hacker who deployed the malware, until a ransom is paid,” but noting that “hackers may 
deploy ransomware that also destroys or exfiltrates data”). 
 97. See Kutcher & Conn, supra note 95. 
 98. Scannell & Chon, supra note 17; Kim Zetter, Why Hospitals Are the Perfect Targets for 
Ransomware, WIRED (Mar. 30, 2016, 1:31 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/ransomware-why-
hospitals-are-the-perfect-targets/ [https://perma.cc/N6LC-P7BM] [hereinafter Zetter I]. 
 99. Scannell & Chon, supra note 17; see also Peterson, supra note 94 (“Health organizations are 
targets because they maintain troves of data with significant resale value in black markets . . . and their 
security practices are often less sophisticated than other industries. . . . Some of the data can be used 
to pursue traditional financial crimes[—]like setting up fraudulent lines of credit. . . . But it can also 
be used for medical insurance fraud, like purchasing medical equipment for resale or obtaining pricey 
medical care for another person. This type of scheme is often not caught as quickly as financial fraud, 
experts said, and could have a lasting affect if it results in a person’s medical history containing false 
information.”). 
 100. Scannell & Chon, supra note 17 (noting that because of the longer “shelf life” of a medical 
record, and due to the lack of detectability by law enforcement, medical records are valued anywhere 
between $200 and $2,000 per record on the black market, as opposed to $1 for a credit card record). 
 101. Id. 
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an effort to learn how insurers and healthcare companies in the United 
States address healthcare challenges and population health.102 
In contrast, the goal behind the more recent ransomware attacks, such 
as that against MedStar, seems to be financially driven, that is, payment of 
the bitcoin ransom.103 Ransomware, which Wired Magazine has referred 
to as “digital extortion,” began in about 2005 and has only grown since its 
inception.104 Ransomware is defined as “malware that locks your keyboard 
or computer to prevent you from accessing your data until you pay a 
ransom, usually demanded in Bitcoin.”105 It can affect various types of 
computer technology, including desktop computers, laptops, and mobile 
phones.106 Historically, the typical means by which ransomware attacks a 
system is through an email that, at first, appears legitimate, but when the 
recipient opens it and clicks on the attachment or a URL site, the 
attachment or website contains a ransomware code that infects the 
recipient’s computer or smart phone with malicious software.107 The 
malicious software “begins encrypting files and folders on local drives, 
any attached drives, backup drives, and potentially other computers on the 
same network that the victim computer is attached to.”108 Ransomware 
hackers have become much more sophisticated, however, and have 
developed techniques that bypass emails or the need for individuals to 
click on a link; rather, hackers can seed legitimate websites with malicious 
code that will infiltrate computers through known gaps in security 
systems.109 Often, the recipient of the malicious software is entirely 
unaware of what is happening until they are unable to access the computer 
                                                     
 102. Id. (“American investigators believe hackers in China target insurers in the US . . . to learn 
how medical coverage and insurer databases are set up, people familiar with the cases said. The records 
are also valuable for intelligence purposes. Addressing healthcare challenges has been a top priority 
of the Chinese government, which is facing an ageing and affluent population that is demanding better 
care. ‘China is very interested in anything that will help them with the illnesses they are dealing with 
and changes in their population.’”). 
 103. Zetter I, supra note 98. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: A Guide to Ransomware, the Scary Hack That’s on the Rise, 
WIRED (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hacker-lexicon-guide-ransomware-scary-
hack-thats-rise/ [https://perma.cc/D6Q7-QZMK] [hereinafter Zetter II]. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Incidents of Ransomware on the Rise, U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Apr. 29, 
2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2016/april/incidents-of-ransomware-on-the-rise/incidents-
of-ransomware-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/KQ2C-WN78] [hereinafter FBI]. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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system or have received a ransom note from the hacker.110 Such was the 
case at MedStar.111 
Ransomware has also grown exponentially as the ability to demand 
and actually collect payment has become easier.112 Kim Zetter of Wired 
Magazine noted, 
Many of these early [ransomware] schemes had a big drawback for 
perpetrators, though: a reliable way to collect money from victims. 
In the early days, online payment methods weren’t popular the way 
they are today, so some victims in Europe and the US were instructed 
to pay ransoms via SMS messages or with pre-paid cards. But the 
growth in digital payment methods, particularly Bitcoin, has greatly 
contributed to ransomware’s proliferation. Bitcoin has become the 
most popular method for demanding ransom because it helps 
anonymize the transactions to prevent extortionists from being 
tracked.113 
In addition to ease of payment, ransomware attacks were further 
spurred by the invention of CryptoLocker.114 CyptoLocker is software that 
infects a computer with a virus initially for the purpose of stealing banking 
credentials, but if the hacker is unable to obtain the credentials, the 
software installs a “backdoor” on the affected computer to extort the 
individual to pay money.115 CryptoLocker was the first of its kind to use 
Bitcoin as the payment method, which made the payment (if and when 
made) almost untraceable.116 After the invention of CryptoLocker, more 
than 500,000 computers were infected over a six-month time period.117 
While only a small percentage of victims paid the ransom demand, it 
nevertheless has become big business for hackers, with the United States 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimating in 2014 that ransom 
seekers made $27 million from those users who decided to pay.118 
The FBI has issued several warnings within the past two years about 
the rise in ransomware attacks, warning not only individuals but 
businesses, government agencies, academic institutions, law enforcement 
                                                     
 110. Id. 
 111. See Cox, supra note 2. 
 112. See Zetter II, supra note 105. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (noting that CryptoLocker was invented by a hacker named Slavik). 
 116. Joseph Conn, Ransomware Scare: Will Hospitals Pay for Protection?, MOD. HEALTHCARE 
(Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160409/MAGAZINE/304099988 
[https://perma.cc/JCY9-Y4C4]. 
 117. See Zetter II, supra note 105. 
 118. Id. 
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agencies, hospitals, school districts, and state and local governments.119 
The FBI has further noted that with the increase in attacks, there has also 
been an increase in the amount of the payoffs being demanded and the 
damage that is being caused to the individuals, businesses, and other 
entities suffering from these attacks.120 Unfortunately, CryptoLocker is 
now only one of several different types of malware, and the ability to guard 
against these attacks is becoming increasingly challenging.121 
The latest attacks against healthcare organizations seem to be related 
to two specific types of ransomware, Locky and Samas.122 The Locky 
virus, the same virus that infiltrated the EHRs of King’s Daughter’s Health 
in Madison, Wisconsin is hidden within emails that are opened by an 
unknowing individual and then moves through the system encrypting 
computer files, thus locking them to the user until access is granted by the 
ransomware attackers.123 Samas, thought to be the likely source of the 
attack on MedStar, attacks certain vulnerabilities in web servers.124 With 
the level of sophistication and manner in which these operations are 
carried out, it is clear that the individuals behind the attacks are 
professionals and that the healthcare industry is becoming a more common 
and frequent target.125 Indeed, Beazley Breach Response Services126 
reported only twelve incidents in 2015 affecting the healthcare industry 
(with thirty-one ransomware attacks to other industries) but reported 
eighteen such attacks in just the first three months of 2016 (with  
twenty-two such attacks to other industries).127 Likewise, another report 
                                                     
 119. Id.; FBI, supra note 107. 
 120. FBI, supra note 107. 
 121. See Zetter II, supra note 105. 
 122. Conn, supra note 116. 
 123. Id.; see also Akanksha Jayanthi, US, Canada Issue Joint Ransomware Alert After 
String of Hospital Attacks, BECKER’S HEALTH IT & CIO REV. (Apr. 1, 2016), 
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-technology/us-canada-issue-joint-
ransomware-alert-after-string-of-hospital-attacks.html [https://perma.cc/2NGH-LGRJ]. 
 124. Conn, supra note 116. The FBI issues two alerts to businesses in the spring of 2016 noting 
that the ransomware Samas (also known as MSIL) attacks servers that are “running out of date versions 
of a type of business software known as JBOSS,” which systems are identified by the hackers utilizing 
a software tool known as JexBoss.  Jim Finkle, FBI Wants U.S. Businesses to Help as Cyber Extortion 
Gains Urgency, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-ransomware-
idUSKCN0WU1GB [https://perma.cc/UTX8-JGW5].  
 125. Id. 
 126. Beazley Breach Response Services is a specialty insurance company that provides insurance 
related to cybersecurity. Beazley Breach Response (BBR), BEAZLEY, https://www.beazley.com/ 
usa/specialty_lines/professional_liability/technology_media_and_business_services/beazley_breach
_response.html [https://perma.cc/95PD-GATX]. 
 127. Id. 
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from Accenture128 estimates that by 2019 one in thirteen patients will have 
had their medical and personal information stolen due to healthcare 
provider data breaches, and that those numbers will continue to rise.129 
This increased attention to the healthcare sector by ransomware 
attackers is, unfortunately, not surprising to many.130 While HITECH has 
been largely successful in its goals of moving the healthcare industry into 
the digital age in an effort to provide better and more coordinated care, it 
has failed to acknowledge the culture that has risen up around the 
importance of information technology (IT) and the long-term investment 
necessary to sustain such systems.131 In a report issued by Peer 60,132 thirty 
percent of hospital executives cited “improving information security” as a 
concern, but more notably, eight other IT concerns were mentioned more 
commonly as top concerns of these executives.133 As one critic noted, 
Many of the small- or medium-sized health care organizations do not 
view IT as an integral part of medical care but rather consider it as a 
mandate that was forced on them by larger hospitals or the federal 
government. Precisely due to this reason, health care organizations 
do not prioritize IT and security technologies in their investments and 
thus do not allocate required resources to ensure the security of their 
                                                     
 128. Accenture is a consulting agency that provides consulting services regarding various sectors 
of business, including digital services and technology. What We Do, ACCENTURE, 
https://www.accenture.com/us-en/company [https://perma.cc/C3NU-NJCM]. 
 129. Brian Kalis et al., The $300 Billion Attack: The Revenue Risk and Human Impact of 
Healthcare Provider Cyber Security Inaction, ACCENTURE (2015), https://www.accenture.com/ 
t20150723T115443__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/ConversionAssets/DotCom/Documents/ 
Global/PDF/Dualpub_19/Accenture-Provider-Cyber-Security-The-$300-Billion-Attack.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K8QB-JVR7] (estimating that by 2019, seven million patients will have their 
medical information stolen, almost two million will become medical identity theft victims, and just 
over one million patients will have to pay out-of-pocket costs related to medical identity theft, 
effectively doubling the number of patients affected in 2015). 
 130. Monte Reel & Jordan Robertson, It’s Way Too Easy To Hack the Hospital, BLOOMBERG 
BUS. WEEK (Nov. 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-hospital-hack/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5429-QZLJ] (citing medical devices and lack of security in connection with such devices as a major 
issue and a gateway for malware into hospital systems). 
 131. Yaraghi, supra note 55. 
 132. Peer60 is a marketing research company that provides services for various industries, 
including healthcare. See Reaction, PEER60, https://www.peer60.com/solutions/ [https://perma.cc/ 
QPE2-XP5P]. 
 133. See Rev360 Editor, Cybersecurity for Hospitals—the Road Ahead (Jan. 28, 2016), 
http://revenue360.net/revenue360_modules/address_demographic_validation/cybersecurity-for-
hospitals-the-road-ahead/ [https://perma.cc/7VWB-LPWH] (citing the Peer60 report which noted the 
following top challenges that the organization needs to address: 64% said “managing switch to value 
based reimbursement models”; 56% said “coordinating care”; 54% said “managing patient 
populations”; 48% said “patient engagement”; 47% said “shortages of physicians and nurses”; 36% 
said “managing data”; 33% said “regulatory compliance”; and 31% said “meaningful ROI on IT 
purchases”). 
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IT systems which makes them especially vulnerable to privacy 
breaches . . . . When it comes to data protection, big technology 
companies are the war ships, and hospitals are small rubber dinghies 
in a sea of hacker sharks. Since IT has not historically been an integral 
part of medical services, hospitals have lagged behind other 
industries on investing in security technologies and attracting top IT 
talents and thus became especially weak and vulnerable to IT 
attacks.134 
Other critics have noted similar concerns related to the culture of the 
healthcare industry when it comes to investment in technology 
infrastructure and maintenance.135 Already required to make a substantial 
capital investment in an electronic system, many providers are unwilling 
to incur the additional expenses associated with maintenance and updates 
to such system, much less adopt additional security measures beyond those 
required by HIPAA, such as backup systems or other security measures 
adopted by more technologically sophisticated industries.136 And yet, even 
if a healthcare system has invested the capital and taken all necessary 
actions to protect such data with the most up-to-date technology and 
highest security, some argue that cybersecurity will forever remain 
challenging and potentially elusive because human error remains one of 
the biggest risks.137 This risk will continue to be an issue, even with 
education and training, as malware attackers continue to refine their skills. 
Thus, it appears that the healthcare industry is in the midst of a 
“perfect storm” of circumstances that make it especially vulnerable to 
these types of attacks. These circumstances include: (a) the industry, as a 
whole, adopted the use of EHRs in a very rapid timeframe, with a focus 
on compliance with HIPAA privacy and security regulations drafted for 
the purpose of preventing disclosure of sensitive information, not guarding 
                                                     
 134. Yaraghi, supra note 55. 
 135. Regina E. Herzlinger, Why Innovation in Health Care is So Hard, HARV. BUS. REV.,  
May 2006, https://hbr.org/2006/05/why-innovation-in-health-care-is-so-hard (noting after the 
implementation of HIPAA, but prior to the HITECH standards, that the healthcare industry is “near 
the bottom of the ladder in terms of IT spending and uniform data standards”). 
 136. Stacy Cowley & Liam Stack, Los Angeles Hospital Pays Hackers $17,000 After Attack, 
N.Y TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/business/los-angeles-hospital-
pays-hackers-17000-after-attack.html?_r=0 (“Health care organizations seem to be particularly 
vulnerable to hacking attacks because they have been slower to embrace sophisticated backup systems 
and other security measures than other industries, like financial services, said Katherine Keefe, the 
head of breach response services at Beazley, an insurance company.”). 
 137. John Halamka, The State of Information Security 2015, LIFE AS A HEALTHCARE CIO BLOG 
(Dec. 9, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://geekdoctor.blogspot.com/2015/12/the-state-of-information-security-
2015.html [https://perma.cc/V6KG-D92X] (citing examples of most common entry of malware into a 
system). 
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against outside attacks;138 (b) malware and ransomware attacks have 
become increasingly more prevalent as hackers,139 the software tools 
available to them,140 and the ability to collect payment through Bitcoin 
have become more sophisticated and exceedingly difficult to police;141 (c) 
unlike in a retail sector, for example, health care providers blocked by 
ransomware from accessing their EHR can result in very serious public 
health and patient safety concerns that might lead many in the industry to 
consider paying the ransom due to the dire consequences caused by lack 
of access to their EHR systems;142 and (d) the health care industry culture, 
perhaps as a result of the rapid adoption of EHR as necessitated by federal 
regulations and the costs associated with such systems, does not appear to 
have yet embraced the need for security regulations outside of mere 
HIPAA compliance.143 While increased vigilance and greater security 
protections are obvious responses, one questions whether such responses 
are truly enough to assure greater protection of patient data and the 
operation and safety of hospitals, doctors’ offices, and other healthcare 
facilities that are so vulnerable to these attacks. 
II. CURRENT LEGAL AND BUSINESS RESPONSES 
A. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Although the HIPAA Security Rule is perhaps the primary source for 
healthcare entities seeking to protect data from cyberattacks, there are 
other federal laws that have been enacted in order to protect personal data, 
such as health records, from hackers.144 Originally enacted as part of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,145 the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA) was the first federal law to address computer crime.146 
Prior to the CFAA, prosecutors relied on mail and/or wire fraud laws for 
                                                     
 138. See Yaraghi, supra note 55. 
 139. FBI, supra note 107. 
 140. Zetter II, supra note 105. 
 141. See FBI, supra note 107. 
 142. See Winton, supra note 15; Cox, supra note 2. 
 143. See Snell, supra note 67. 
 144. See Katherine Booth Wellington, Cyberattacks on Medical Devices and Hospital Networks: 
Legal Gaps and Regulatory Solutions, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 151–52 (2014). 
 145. See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030). Note that, when enacted, 
the law was referred to as the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, 
but was shortened to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act after an amendment to the law in 1986. 
 146. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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most computer-related crimes.147 While the first version of the CFAA was 
rather limited in scope,148 the law was extensively amended in 1986 and 
has since been amended numerous times.149 As amended, the CFAA 
punishes individuals who knowingly, intentionally, and maliciously 
transmit code or access protected computers and such action causes harm, 
including attacks against hospital EHRs.150 The penalties for violating the 
CFAA can be quite steep, and can result in a fine, imprisonment for not 
more than ten years, or both for a first offense in which the individual 
“intentionally causes damage without authorization to a protected 
computer.”151 The CFAA also imposes penalties for an individual who 
“intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization and as 
a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage,” which can result in a 
fine, imprisonment up to five years, or both.152 
While the penalties are potentially steep and the language of the 
CFAA is quite broad in its application,153 most of the prosecutions under 
                                                     
 147. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., United States v. Nosal: Rebooting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
8 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 257, 262 (2012). 
 148. For example, under the first version of the law, enacted in 1984, only federal government 
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provide the Secret Service with authority to investigate certain computer crimes. Comprehensive 
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https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H7HR-TXLV]; see also Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
474, 100 Stat. 1213; Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2097, 
enacted as Title XXIX of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
2013-322, 108 Stat. 1796; Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat. 
3488, 3491; Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272; Identity 
Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, codified as Title II of the Former Vice President 
Protection Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-326, 122 Stat. 3560 (2008). 
 150. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A), (B) (2012). 
 151. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (2008). 
 152. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i) (2008). 
 153. See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127 
(W.D. Wash. 2000) (finding that amendments to the CFAA and congressional reports indicate that the 
statute was meant to be applied broadly). Note, however, that certain provisions of the CFAA that 
include specific language related to when an employee is using a computer “without authorization” 
have been interpreted rather narrowly by certain circuits and broadly by others. See United States v. 
John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010); 
and EF Cultural Travel BV. v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001) (all holding that an 
employee could be in violation of the CFAA if the employee accessed information on the computer 
without permission, even if the employer did not take means to make such information inaccessible). 
But see United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) and WEC Carolina Energy Solutions 
LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012) (each holding that “without authorization” under the 
CFAA is limited to situations where the employee no longer has access to the information, as such 
provision is intended for “outside” hackers). 
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the CFAA have been focused on individuals such as employees or 
independent contractors, and much of the defense centers around whether 
such individual had “authorization” under the statute to access the 
protected computer.154 In fact, there have been few instances of 
prosecution under the CFAA of unknown criminal hackers.155 One of the 
reasons that hackers have been less likely to be prosecuted under the 
CFAA is because of the complexities and challenges associated with 
identifying and apprehending a hacker, especially individuals located in 
foreign jurisdictions.156 Computer networks in general are vastly 
complicated, consisting of the use of various private networks (such as a 
virtual private network (or VPN) that encrypts the data sent over such 
network and protects the applicable internet protocol (IP) address).157 
Healthcare entities use such VPN networks to ensure protection of data 
that may be accessed remotely by employees or agents.158 As Larry 
Greenemeier points out, however, when it comes to hackers, this can 
become even more complex: 
Cyber attackers use viruses, worms and other malware to take control 
of Internet servers or even personal computers, creating a network of 
                                                     
 154. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 149, at 6–12; Larkin, supra note 147. Perhaps 
the most notable prosecution under the CFAA was the conviction of Aaron Swartz, a twenty-six year-
old, self-described internet activist who was prosecuted under the CFAA after he downloaded a large 
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Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, SCI. AM. (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/ 
article/its-times-reform-computer-fraud-abuse-act/ [https://perma.cc/F3HZ-BSPA] (arguing that the 
CFAA has been overly prosecuted and needs to be reformed). 
 155. See Wellington, supra note 144 (citing United States v. McGraw, No. 3:09-CR-0210-B, 
2012 WL 6004208 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2012); United States v. McGraw, No. 3:09-CR-0210-B, 2012 
WL 6013258 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2012) in which Jesse McGraw was convicted under the CFAA in 
connection with accessing a hospital network and downloading malicious software). 
 156. Larry Greenemeier, Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace Back to 
Hackers, SCI. AM. (June 11, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tracking-cyber-
hackers/ [https://perma.cc/3ELM-WZJT]. 
 157. Id. (“By way of example, Nicol points out that he uses a virtual private network that 
connects to a proxy server before connecting him to the Internet. This enables him to encrypt data he 
sends over the network and protect the identity of his own Internet protocol (IP) address. ‘I do this to 
thwart information harvesting that commercial Web sites usually have,’ he adds.”). 
 158. SSL Servs. LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (defining a 
“virtual private network” as “system for securing communications between computers over an open 
network such as the Internet”). 
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“zombie” computers (also called botnets) under their control that they 
can use to launch their attacks. As a result, an attack may appear to 
come from a particular server or computer, but this does not mean the 
attack originated at that device, . . . [and] often a string of proxies 
located in different countries are used in an attack, “greatly 
complicating the legal process of trying to piece it all together.”159 
Hackers have the ability to not only encrypt their identity through software 
or “mask” their IP addresses but also leave “false flags” that will implicate 
other individuals, which leads one to believe that the hacker was an 
entirely different person.160 Thus, hackers are, by design, almost 
impossible to identify with certainty.161 
Independent of the challenges in simply locating a particular 
individual or network of individuals who may be responsible, there are 
various jurisdictional issues created by the fact that many hackers hail 
from locations outside the United States.162 Historically, China has been a 
particularly common place for hackers, but attacks have also originated in 
Russia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and various Western countries.163 
With origination of these attacks in various countries, one of the main 
issues is attributing the particular cyberattack to a particular individual or 
group and then obtaining cooperation from other law enforcement officials 
in other countries (assuming such countries have similar laws that might 
criminalize cyber or computer fraud).164 While there has been some 
                                                     
 159. Greenemeier, supra note 156. Duncan Hollis has described a similar scenario in more real 
life terms:  
Imagine Twitter falls victim to a cyberattack. Twitter’s systems keep a record . . . of every 
IP address visiting its site, which allows it to identify the attacker’s IP address. It can then 
use the IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) database to identify which internet 
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Duncan B. Hollis, An E-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 398–99 (2011). 
 160. Hollis, supra note 159, at 397 (“The most sophisticated cyber exploitations may never be 
discovered. A high-level attack might be attributed to mere computer error. This situation is unlikely 
to change anytime soon; it is a systematic aspect of the Internet, not a simply problem to be fixed.”). 
 161. See id. 
 162. Joseph Menn, Analysis: The Near Impossible Battle Against Hackers Everywhere,  
REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2013, 3:04 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-battle-
idUSBRE91N03520130224 [https://perma.cc/MMB7-E46R]. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Hollis, supra note 159, at 392. 
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international cooperation with respect to cyberattacks, including the 
Convention on Cybercrime, which is now joined by twenty-nine European 
countries and the U.S.,165 such laws do not necessarily include attacks 
coming from a military or intelligence agency, or individuals or groups 
acting pursuant to a lawful government authority.166 This exclusion 
includes activities that may be done for investigation purposes or to protect 
national security, which has led to a lack of clarity regarding when the 
activity of a country might otherwise have qualified as a cybercrime.167 
Even with uniformity in the laws and some international cooperation 
regarding enforcement, anonymity, and the ability to actually identify the 
hackers remains elusive.168 
B. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act 
Given some of the challenges in attempting to apprehend and 
prosecute cyber attackers, there are other statutory responses that endeavor 
to aid in exchange of data to facilitate more coordinated and robust 
defenses. For example, in response to the recent increase in ransomware 
attacks across all industries and increasing concerns with cybersecurity 
generally the U.S. Congress enacted the Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act (CISA) in 2015.169 Unlike the CFAA, which is focused on 
enforcement, the CISA is instead centered on the idea that cybersecurity 
threats, especially those related to national security, may potentially be 
thwarted or at least diminished by greater sharing of threat information.170 
The sharing of information is entirely voluntary under the CISA, but the 
intention is to address what has been a major barrier with the sharing of 
this data. This would assuage fears on the part of companies that 
monitoring and implementing defensive mechanisms or sharing the data 
with others could result in liability under any number of laws,171 including 
                                                     
 165. Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185, 
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 167. Id. at 393–94. 
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 169. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) was passed as part of the Consolidated 
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PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/22/the-controversial-surveillance-act-obama-just-signed.html 
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the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,172 the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA),173 antitrust laws,174 privacy laws (such as HIPAA 
and HITECH),175 and potentially a waiver of attorney–client privilege or 
similar protections.176 
In order to guard against potential application of these laws, the 
CISA contains a number of provisions that endeavor to accomplish this 
goal. First, the CISA contains an express federal preemption pursuant to 
which the CISA “supersedes any statute or other provision of law of a State 
or political subdivision of a State that restricts or otherwise expressly 
regulates an activity authorized under [the CISA].”177 This preemption is 
limited, however, by any other law “concerning the use of authorized law 
enforcement practices and procedures.”178 In addition to this express 
preemption, there are a number of other provisions that provide additional 
protections (and encouragement) for companies to share information 
regarding cyberattacks. Specifically, the CISA permits a company to 
“monitor” and “operate defensive measures” for cybersecurity purposes 
on its own systems or on a third-party system, with authorization from 
such third party,179 thus enabling companies to monitor their systems 
without the potential liability concerns of infringing on privacy rights of 
individuals.180 
Second, companies are permitted, notwithstanding any provision of 
law to the contrary, to share information with or receive information from 
federal, state, or local governments in connection with “cyber threat 
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indicators”181 or “defensive measures,”182 so long as such measures are for 
cybersecurity purposes.183 As alluded to above, because of the application 
of various existing laws and fears regarding the sharing of personal data, 
companies have been reticent to share any information regarding 
cyberattacks or cyber threats.184 Congress surmises, however, that such 
information would be very helpful in preventing attacks and identifying 
attackers because it would enable a government authority to develop 
means to prevent common schemes and to recognize the markers and 
“signatures” of common hackers, thus making them easier to identify.185 
Although the law provides for preemption, in an attempt to maintain some 
of the original intent of the various privacy laws in place, the CISA 
requires that companies remove any information that is not directly related 
to a cybersecurity threat and that the company knows to be personal 
information identifying a particular person.186 Lastly, so long as all of the 
provisions for sharing under the CISA are followed, the CISA provides 
protections against liability in connection with data sharing,187 prosecution 
                                                     
 181. The statute defines cyber threat indicator as  
information that is necessary to describe or identify- (A) malicious reconnaissance . . . (B) 
a method of defeating a security control or exploitation of a security vulnerability; (C) a 
security vulnerability . . . (D) a method of causing a user with legitimate access to an 
information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an 
information system to unwittingly enable the defeat of a security control or exploitation of 
a security vulnerability; (E) malicious cyber command and control; (F) the actual or 
potential harm caused by an incident . . . (G) any other attribute of a cyber security threat, 
if disclosure of such attribute is not otherwise prohibited by law; or (H) any combination 
thereof.  
6 U.S.C. § 1501(6) (2015). 
 182. A “defensive measure” is defined as “an action, device, procedure, signature, technique, or 
other measure applied to an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or 
transiting an information system that detects, prevents, or mitigates a known or suspected 
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.” 6 U.S.C. § 1501(7)(A) (2015). 
 183. Id. 
 184. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-FEDERAL 
ENTITIES TO SHARE CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES WITH FEDERAL 
ENTITIES UNDER THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015 (June 15, 2016), 
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/Non-Federal_Entity_Sharing_Guidance_ 
%28Sec%20105%28a%29%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q7K-RWSM] [hereinafter GUIDANCE]. 
 185. Id. 
 186. 6 U.S.C. § 1503(d)(2)(A)–(B) (2015). 
 187. 6 U.S.C. § 1505(b)(1) (2015); 6 U.S.C. § 1505(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2015) (protecting against 
liability in any court against any private entity for the sharing or receipt of a cyber threat indicator or 
defensive measure, so long as shared through the Department of Homeland Security process). 
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under antitrust laws,188 attorney–client privilege waiver concerns,189 
liability related to disclosure of proprietary information,190 application 
from FOIA provisions,191 and use of information to regulate other lawful 
activity.192 
1. Healthcare Task Force 
Perhaps recognizing both the extensive privacy concerns and the lack 
of readiness and preparedness of the healthcare industry in combating 
cyberattacks, the CISA contains a specific section relating to the 
healthcare industry and stresses the need for increased vigilance in this 
sector.193 Under Section 1533 of the CISA, HHS is required to issue a 
report divisions within one year from the date of enactment on its 
preparedness to respond to cybersecurity threats, including a statement 
regarding who will lead and coordinate the efforts and how divisions and 
subdivisions194 will divide responsibilities and communicate across.195 
Additionally, CISA directed HHS to convene a task force made up of 
healthcare industry stake holders, cybersecurity experts, and others as 
determined by other agencies or the Secretary of HHS for the purpose of 
planning a single system in which the federal government and those in the 
healthcare industry can share information regarding cybersecurity threats 
and also make recommendations for protections for network medical 
                                                     
 188. 6 U.S.C. § 1503(e)(1) (2015) (limiting such waiver only if the sharing of information is for 
the purpose of preventing, investigating, or mitigating threats). It should be noted, however, that 
Section 1507(e) of the statute expressly states that the antitrust exemption set forth in Section 1503 
shall not “be construed to permit price-fixing, allocating a market between competitors, monopolizing 
or attempting to monopolize a market, boycotting, or exchanges of price or cost information, customer 
lists, or information regarding future competitive planning.” 6 U.S.C. § 1507(e) (2015). Thus, the only 
exemptions under antitrust law appear to be limited to those activities that fall outside per se violations 
of the Sherman Act or involve the sharing of information that leads to per se violations. 6 U.S.C. § 
1507 (2015). 
 189. 6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(1) (2015) (waiving attorney–client privilege and related legal 
protections, including trade secrets, but limited only for sharing under the CISA—and not to state or 
local governments or other third parties). 
 190. 6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(2) (2015) (noting that proprietary information will not be further 
disclosed so long as the disclosing entity designates such information as proprietary). 
 191. 6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(3) (2015). 
 192. 6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(5)(D)(i) (2015) (prohibiting use of any information shared for the 
purpose of regulating (including an enforcement action) lawful activities of a private party). 
 193. 6 U.S.C. § 1533 (2015). 
 194. HHS has eleven operating divisions, eight agencies within the U.S. Public Health Service, 
and three human services agencies. For a complete list, see HHS Agencies & Offices, HHS.GOV, 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/hhs-agencies-and-offices/index.html [https://perma.cc/SN69-
9ZLA]. 
 195. 6 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2015). 
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devices and EHRs.196 Recognizing that the healthcare industry can likely 
utilize existing resources from industries that already have highly 
developed security protection systems and capabilities, the task force is 
specifically instructed to “analyze how industries, other than the 
healthcare industry, have implemented strategies and safeguards for 
addressing cybersecurity threats within their respective industries.”197 The 
task force is required to complete its task within one year, and it has sixty 
days after its termination to disseminate its findings to the healthcare 
industry for purposes of utilizing recommendations by healthcare 
entities.198 HHS has published little information about its progress, only 
naming the members of the task force—made up of members representing 
hospitals, insurers, patient advocates, security researchers, pharmacy and 
pharmaceutical companies, medical device manufacturers, health 
information technology developers and vendors, and laboratories—and 
noting the dates on which the task force held its four in-person meetings 
(and some periodic teleconferences with tasks), which were to be 
completed by March 2017.199 Thus, Congress and other security experts 
appear to acknowledge that the healthcare industry is particularly 
vulnerable and exposed in terms of its capacity and ability to deal with and 
combat cybersecurity issues.200 
2. Federal Guidance 
Pursuant to CISA requirements, HHS and the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) issued guidance on February 16, 2016 and published an 
updated version of such guidance on June 15, 2016 (collectively, the 
“Guidance”).201 The Guidance was intended to assist private entities in 
understanding how information under CISA should be shared with the 
federal government.202 The Guidance acknowledges that while the CISA 
does permit an entity to share information for cybersecurity purposes 
notwithstanding any other provision of law (including HIPAA and 
HITECH), it does nevertheless require the removal of any information that 
                                                     
 196. 6 U.S.C. § 1533(c) (2015). 
 197. 6 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(1)(A) (2015). 
 198. 6 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2) & (3) (2015). 
 199. Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, http://www.phe.gov/ 
preparedness/planning/CyberTF/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/M842-TGWD]. Note that the 
in-person meetings will be open to the public, but the teleconferences in between are intended for 
administrative issues only and will not be open to the public. Id. 
 200. Id. (noting that “healthcare data may be used for a variety of nefarious purposes, including 
fraud, identify theft, and disruption of hospitals systems” and that leaving such systems unprotected 
could cause a risk to patient safety and thus should be afforded the highest level of care). 
 201. GUIDANCE, supra note 184. 
 202. Id. 
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it knows to be personal or that identifies a particular individual who is not 
directly related to a cybersecurity threat.203 Highlighting particularly 
sensitive information where this might most frequently arise, there is 
specific reference in the Guidance to, among other sensitive information, 
PHI.204 The Guidance states: 
[S]haring [certain sensitive categories of information] in a form that 
constitutes or includes personal information of a specific individual 
or information that identifies a specific individual may not be 
necessary. For instance, while sharing the medical condition of a 
particular individual targeted for a phishing attack is unlikely to be 
useful or directly related to a cybersecurity threat, sharing an 
anonymized characterization of the cyber threat may have utility.205 
Thus, the Guidance clarifies that the expectation of the federal 
government is that the information that is shared is “technical information 
that describes the attributes of a cybersecurity threat that generally need 
not include various categories of information that are considered 
sensitive.”206 Finally, the Guidance highlights the various processes that 
can be utilized to share the data under the CISA, including an “Automated 
Indicator Sharing” (AIS) system,207 submission of information by 
completing a web form on the Department of Homeland Security website, 
email submissions through the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (through a web-based portal), or 
through the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers or Information 
Sharing and Analysis Organizations.208 These centers are private 
organizations that will share the information with the Department of 
Homeland Security on behalf of the disclosing entity.209 Given the report 
required to be issued by HHS and the goals and purpose of the task force 
for healthcare, it is not entirely clear if healthcare entities wishing to report 
under the CISA will continue to report by the methods set forth in the 
                                                     
 203. Id. at 8. 
 204. Id. at 9–10 (mentioning human resource information, consumer information/history, 
education history, financial information, property ownership information, and information identifying 
children under the age of 13). 
 205. Id. at 8. 
 206. Id. at 8–9. 
 207. Id. at 13. This system enables timely exchange of data in a secure manner, utilizing the 
Structured Threat Information eXchange (STIX) and Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator 
Information (TAXII), which requires the user to have TAXII capabilities that communicate with the 
government’s TAXII servers. 
 208. Id. at 13-14. 
 209. Id. There are other means of sharing set forth in the Guidance, but only the sharing 
mechanisms set forth above will enable the entity to access the liability and waiver protections set 
forth under the CISA. Id. at 15. 
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Guidance or if there will be an entirely different process or procedure 
established that is uniquely designed for the healthcare industry.210 
3. CISA Criticisms and Challenges 
While the intention of the CISA was to ease communication between 
government and companies when it comes to cyberattacks in order to 
potentially combat and prevent them, there are critics of the law who are 
concerned that, despite attempts to the contrary, the statute will 
compromise privacy concerns.211 Indeed, it took more than four years for 
the bill to be enacted into law, in large part because of the very strong 
opposition by privacy experts and civil libertarians, who argued that the 
broad language in the law would provide the government with access to 
sensitive information from private entities and could allow use of the 
information for other purposes.212 
Still other critics believe that this law does not go far enough to 
prevent these attacks.213 These critics are concerned that, because sharing 
information is entirely voluntary, companies do not have sufficient 
incentives or motivation to report cyberattacks and cyber threats any more 
than they did previously.214 Additionally, there are concerns that any 
response that can be generated or created as a result of the information 
sharing will be too little, too late.215 As Abigail Tracey stated, 
Many argue that cybercrime evolves at a rate that not only outpaced 
the Senate’s legislation but that makes the sharing of information 
                                                     
 210. See Joseph Conn, Federal Task Force Takes on Healthcare Cybersecurity, MOD. 
HEALTHCARE (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160416/MAGAZINE/ 
304169890 [https://perma.cc/MPK6-8FSK]. 
 211. See Caldwell, supra note 171 (“The thing is, critics saw that bill as [a] way for government 
agencies to more easily keep tabs on Americans without their knowledge. CISA was derided by 
privacy advocates and tech titans alike. . . . In other words, organizations like the NSA and CIA now 
have even more government protections allowing them to play fast and loose with personal privacy. 
And our private information—already clearly at risk, given the large quantity of data breaches of late—
is now even more freely available.”). 
 212. Brett V. Newman, Hacking the Current System: Congress’ Attempt to Pass Data Security 
and Breach Notification Legislation, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 437, 447–48 (2015) (discussing 
privacy concerns and other challenges with passing the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 
2014). 
 213. Jay Shelton, Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act—Is it Enough?, ASSURANCE (Dec. 7, 
2015), http://www.assuranceagency.com/blog-post/cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-is-it-
enough [https://perma.cc/DFU4-WGK4] (“While most agree that CISA is a good start, many question 
if the bill will go far enough in providing consumer data protections against network breaches.”). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Abigail Tracy, The Problems Experts and Privacy Advocates Have with the Senate’s 
Cybersecurity Bill, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2015, 8:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailtracy/ 
2015/10/29/the-problems-experts-and-privacy-advocates-have-with-the-senates-cybersecurity-
bill/#1729c3f430fc. 
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across companies [sic] effectively useless because in many cases by 
the time this happens, it is too late for corporations to defend 
themselves. “Hackers are changing their methodologies in 
milliseconds. Information sharing is going to take days, weeks, and 
months. Will this idea keep up with the pace of sophisticated hackers? 
That is the question that needs to be asked.”216 
Although one year’s time for formation of a task force and issuance of its 
report is rapid speed relative to government processes, the movement of 
cyberattacks and the necessity to implement corresponding security 
measures will likely far outpace the thoughtful process currently 
underway.217 In response to critiques that the new law is not responding 
decisively or rapidly enough, supporters, including the College of 
Healthcare Information Management Executives and Healthcare 
Information and Management Systems Society, contend that, at a 
minimum, the law provides one resource that will direct the healthcare 
industry to a set of best practices for cybersecurity.218 Further, supporters 
argue that any law needs to remain voluntary until it is known what sorts 
of guidelines or methods would be effective in combating cybercrime.219 
C. Current State of the EHR Industry 
The lack of consistent standards and best practices in the EHR 
industry is caused at least in part by the current state of such industry.220 
One notable obstacle in establishing optimal security measures for 
purposes of guarding EHRs against hackers and ransomware attacks is the 
sheer number of EHR companies and EHR systems.221 In 2013, Medical 
                                                     
 216. Id. (quoting Craig Newman, an expert on cyber law and chair of the Privacy and Data 
Security practice at Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP). 
 217. David Harlow, CISA: Big Brother is Watching, HEALTHBLAWG (Dec. 22, 2015), 
http://healthblawg.com/2015/12/cisa-big-brother-is-watching.html [https://perma.cc/4MN7-29HB] 
(“The notion of analyzing cybersecurity threats at one point in time via a task force that will sunset 
out of existence after delivering its report simply is not a realistic response to the dynamic nature of 
the threat environment today.”). 
 218. John Frank, Don’t Expect Legislative Defenses Against Cyberattacks Anytime Soon, MED. 
ECON. (Apr. 10, 2016), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/ 
don-t-expect-legislative-defenses-against-cyberattacks-anytime-soon?page=0%2C1 
[https://perma.cc/PWE7-Z3RQ]. 
 219. Id. 
 220. HENRY ET AL., supra note 32 (noting that while the number of providers adopting an EHR 
have greatly increased, there remains variability with the adoption of functionalities and use of such 
EHRs). 
 221. See Ryan Shay, EHR Adoption Rates: 19 Must-See Stats, PRACTICE FUSION: PRACTICE 
FUSION BLOG (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.practicefusion.com/blog/ehr-adoption-rates/ 
[https://perma.cc/39FE-PVKM] (noting approximately 1,100 EHR vendors currently, which is double 
the amount that existed four years ago). 
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Economics noted that the government’s best estimate was that there were 
729 companies offering certified EHR systems for medical providers.222 
Medical Economics stated, however, that even the government estimates 
are difficult to judge because basic financial information about public and 
private companies is difficult to garner, and it speculated that the industry 
is likely to witness consolidation or closure of weaker EHR companies.223 
Just two years after the report by Medical Economics, the number of EHR 
vendors has actually increased, and as predicted, some of the consolidation 
predicted appears to be taking root, at least in terms of market share.224 For 
example, more than 50% of the market share for individual healthcare 
professionals is occupied by just five EHR companies (Epic Systems, 
Allscripts, eClinicalWorks, NextGen Healthcare, and GE Healthcare) and 
more than 60% of the market share for hospitals is comprised of just three 
EHR companies (Cerner, MEDITECH, and Epic Systems).225 All of this 
information is important and impactful when considering the EHR 
landscape because providers do not want to have to make the costly and 
                                                     
 222. Daniel R. Verdon, Top 100 EHRs: Why Understanding a Company’s Financial 
Performance Today May Influence Purchasing Decisions Tomorrow, MED. ECON. (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/content/tags/ehr/top-100-ehrs-
why-understanding-company-s-financial-performance-to [https://perma.cc/7HPJ-4FP2]. It should be 
noted that Verdon’s article was reporting data from 2013, prior to when most of the “meaningful use” 
regulations were mandatory. Verdon acknowledged that “some companies won’t be able to clear the 
technological and regulatory hurdles of the government’s 2014 incentive program, conversion to the 
International Classification of Diseases-10th revision (ICD-10) or the development costs to make it 
happen.” Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Quick-Stats: Certified Health IT 
Vendors and Editions Reported by Ambulatory Health Care Professionals Participating in the 
Medicare EHR Incentive Program, HEALTH IT DASHBOARD, HEALTHIT.GOV (July 2016), 
https://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIG-Vendors-of-EHRs-to-Participating-
Professionals.php (noting, “As of July 2016, 632 vendors supply certified health IT to 337,432 
ambulatory primary care physicians, medical and surgical specialists, podiatrists, optometrists, 
dentists, and chiropractors participating in the Medicare EHR Incentive Program”). This compares to 
“175 certified health IT vendors [that] supply certified health IT to the 4,474 non-federal acute care 
hospitals, including Critical Access hospitals, participating in the Medicare EHR Incentive Program.” 
Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Quick-Stats: Certified Health IT Vendors and 
Editions Reported by Hospitals Participating in the Medicare EHR Incentive Program, HEALTH IT 
DASHBOARD, HEALTHIT.GOV (July 2016), https://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIG-
Vendors-of-EHRs-to-Participating-Hospitals.php [https://perma.cc/V6S6-Z2X6]. 
 225. Helen Gregg, 50 Things to Know About Epic, Cerner, MEDITECH, McKesson, 
athenahealth and Other Major EHR Vendors, BECKER’S HEALTH IT & CIO REV. (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-technology/50-things-to-know-
about-epic-cerner-meditech-mckesson-athenahealth-and-other-major-ehr-vendors.html 
[https://perma.cc/T843-93EW]. Becker’s Health IT Review noted in 2014 that just ten EHR 
companies account for ninety percent of the total market. 
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disruptive EHR transition more than once.226 Although providers are 
loathe to change their existing EHR systems, having many smaller 
companies (with fewer clients) in the market can lead to financial 
instability within such smaller companies, leading to an increase in 
mergers, closure, or bankruptcy.227 This instability can also hinder 
advancement and development of technology.228 Such challenges have 
caused many providers to incur the cost of a challenging EHR transition 
more than once.229 When providers are faced with a second or third 
transition, they will typically seek out larger EHR companies to avoid the 
same difficulties again.230 Such instability in the market and movement 
between systems can potentially exacerbate healthcare industry 
vulnerabilities.231 
The size of the EHR market and the potential consolidation has also 
led to other market challenges, such as an increasing trend toward the 
involvement of EHR companies in malpractice lawsuits and other lawsuits 
related to patient safety.232 While the number of malpractice lawsuits 
remains small at approximately 1%, the frequency has been increasing in 
recent years, doubling from 2013 to 2014.233 Many of these lawsuits have 
arisen out of errors in patient files that were the result of issues with a 
system’s EHR, including “faulty voice-recognition software; 
[m]isinterpretation of EHR drop-down menus; [r]eliance on outdated or 
incorrect records; and [t]ypos that led to medical errors.”234 According to 
                                                     
 226. See Michael McBride, Understanding the True Costs of an EHR Implementation Plan, 
MED. ECON. (July 25, 2012), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/ 
news/modernmedicine/modern-medicine-feature-articles/understanding-true-costs-ehr-?page=full 
(highlighting all of the direct and indirect-and sometimes hidden-costs of implementing a new EHR 
system). 
 227. See Gregg, supra note 225. 
 228. Id. (“Recently, the EHR market has seen an infusion of providers seeking replacements for 
their current systems. Surveys suggest between 12 and 30 percent of providers are dissatisfied with 
their EHR. Girish Navani, CEO and co-founder of eClinicalWorks, said in 2013 more than half of his 
company’s new clients came from another vendor.”). 
 229. Id. 
 230. See id. 
 231. See Sittig & Singh, supra note 38, at e1044; David W. Bates et al., A Proposal for Electronic 
Medical Records in U.S. Primary Care, 10 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 1, 6–7 (2003) (“Another 
barrier has been the transience of vendors; many early [electronic medical records (EMR)] developers 
are in precarious financial positions or event defunct. Consequently, primary care practices see 
implementing EMRs from current vendors as risky.”). 
 232. In Just One Year, the Number of EHR-Related Lawsuits Doubled, ADVISORY BOARD  
(May 6, 2015, 8:41 AM), https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2015/05/06/ehr-lawsuits [https:// 
perma.cc/2PFC-RAU6] [hereinafter ADVISORY BOARD]; Lisa Schencker, EHR Safety Goes to Court, 
MOD. HEALTHCARE (June 25, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160625/ 
MAGAZINE/306259982 [https://perma.cc/7LKR-S5EC]. 
 233. ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 232. 
 234. Id. 
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Modern Healthcare, “Medical malpractice insurer the Doctors Co. closed 
twenty-eight claims in 2013 involving EHRs, and nearly that many during 
the first two quarters of 2014. In all, the Doctors Co. closed ninety-seven 
claims involving EHRs from January 2007 to June 2014.”235 To the extent 
that this trend continues to increase, litigation and legal costs could further 
stress the financial stability of the EHR market and many existing 
healthcare facilities. 
Similar to those issues raised in a malpractice lawsuit, patient safety 
has also become a focus, particularly in a case involving a warring 
healthcare provider and an EHR vendor.236 In this particular lawsuit, EHR-
vendor Cerner filed a breach of contract lawsuit against PinnacleHealth 
after PinnacleHealth cancelled its twenty-year contract with Siemens 
(which was bought by Cerner) and instead entered into a contract with 
Siemen’s competitor, Epic Systems Corp.237 PinnacleHealth filed a 
counterclaim alleging fraud and breach of contract related to various 
patient safety issues that came about as a result of the Cerner EHR-
software.238 These patient safety issues included challenges in discharging 
a patient with the wrong medication, ordering pharmaceuticals not 
available to certain patients as a result of the EHR system, and failing to 
track patients.239 
While malpractice and patient safety claims related to EHRs remain 
relatively low, there are nevertheless real concerns to the extent that these 
claims have become more widespread. First, individual user error accounts 
for the vast majority of the one percent of malpractice claims against 
vendors that have already been filed.240 Additionally, even if a plaintiff 
could prove that the error was in fact inherent in the structure, design, or 
operation of the EHR system, providers are often still taking on the 
greatest level of risk because EHR vendors frequently include “hold 
harmless” provisions in their contracts that make it difficult for the 
provider to seek redress from the vendor.241 Even if such claims are 
                                                     
 235. Schencker, supra note 232. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Answer, Amended New Matter, Amended Counterclaim, Third-Party Complaint and Jury 
Demand, Cerner Health Servs., Inc. v. Pinnacle Health Sys., No. 15-05453 (C.P., Chester City, Pa. 
May 23, 2016). 
 239. Id. at 65–72. 
 240. Schencker, supra note 232 (noting that 64% of EHR-related claims in this sample involved 
user errors, 42% involved issues with the EHR system itself (some with more than one contributing 
factor), 10% involved a failure of system design, and 9% involved an electronic system or technology 
failure). 
 241. Id. Even with this increase in claims against EHRs, many critics argue that EHRs, 
nevertheless, make care better and generally improve patient safety as opposed to undermine it. See 
also ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 232. 
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challenging to prove, the fact that EHR vendors could face increased 
liability (and related costs) may create financial issues for certain EHR 
companies, which in turn will create difficulties for clients and customers 
in the form of increased costs, decreased financial stability of existing 
companies, and resulting transitions. 
Despite government regulations to combat cyberattacks in the form 
of the CFAA and now the CISA, there are nevertheless distinct and 
significant challenges to addressing and combatting sophisticated 
cyberattacks, especially those affecting patient safety such as malware 
attacks. While the CFAA creates an enforcement mechanism for catching 
perpetrators of malware attacks and carries substantial penalties, 
jurisdictional challenges remain as many attacks occur in locations outside 
the United States, and hackers remain elusive with sophisticated methods 
of remaining relatively anonymous.242 In contrast, the CISA is intended to 
share information among industry professionals to enable them to work 
together to prevent attacks from happening, but the voluntary nature of the 
program and necessary infrastructure development for the healthcare 
sector make it difficult for this law to be any sort of immediate response 
or solution to the recent cyberattacks.243 Likewise, changes and shifts in 
the industry and some consolidation in the very crowded field of EHR 
space have contributed to some past market instability, and it seems as 
though this trend may continue over the next few years.244 This lack of 
stability along with a trend toward increased liability for EHR vendors 
could hold the industry back from moving more rapidly away from 
focusing on EHR adoption and more toward promoting greater security in 
EHR products. 
III. ADDRESSING AND COMBATING CYBER CONCERNS 
While HIPAA and HITECH provide an existing structure for 
addressing security concerns and although certain updates and changes are 
certainly warranted for a now thirteen-year-old law, it would be naïve to 
think that simply updating the now-antiquated law can be the only 
sufficient solution. Rather, the approach must be multi-faceted and include 
not only some changes to existing law—including changes to HIPAA, 
                                                     
 242. See Greenemeir, supra note 156. 
 243. See generally supra notes 211–217. 
 244. Ross Koppel & Christopher U. Lehmann, Implications of an Emerging EHR Monoculture 
for Hospitals and Healthcare Systems, 22 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 465, 466 (Oct. 23, 2014) 
(noting that while there is some increased pressure for industry consolidation, existing vendor products 
compete greatly, and thus, integration will take years and pressure for competing data standards will 
be enhanced by consolidation). 
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HITECH and others—but also to the culture and demands of the healthcare 
industry. Any changes to existing law must also be accompanied by some 
shifts in the industry wherein healthcare providers not only move IT and 
IT security to the forefront of their priorities but also demand a better 
product from their EHR vendors.245 Additionally, the industry must work 
on moving closer to HIPAA’s ultimate goals of interoperability and 
communication between EHR systems to reduce some of the 
fragmentation that makes healthcare providers such an easy target. The 
following subsections will now address each of those proposed solutions 
in turn. 
A. Amending HIPAA and Other Laws 
Leaving existing regulations in their current form cannot be a 
solution, and it seems equally clear that while updating the now  
thirteen-year-old security regulations under HIPAA may help curb 
ransomware attacks and other cyberattacks, that cannot be the singular 
solution.246 HIPAA, in its origins, was intended more for the purpose of 
improving healthcare outcomes and patient care by creating better 
communication and information exchange between providers and 
reducing some of the fragmentation that has plagued the U.S. healthcare 
system since the late 1970s.247 With this focus in mind, the security 
concerns, which emerged in an age of a less sophisticated internet 
marketplace, first emphasized preventing public disclosures by the 
provider of a patient’s private health information.248 Thus, the regulations 
emphasized the actions of the healthcare entity, through its employees, 
agents, and business associates, as the most likely disclosing entity. 
In contrast, ransomware and related attacks are rarely coming from 
authorized users within the HIPAA-covered entity; rather, such access is 
being sought by third parties attempting to access the data externally.249 
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Granted, with the initial slow adoption of EHR systems, amending the 
security regulations sufficient to maintain pace with the rapid expansion 
and evolution of cybercrimes became secondary to simply encouraging 
use of EHRs and ensuring providers had time to adjust to the HIPAA 
disclosure regulations under the Privacy Rule.250 Now that such EHR 
adoption has become more widespread,251 more emphasis needs to be 
placed on making sure that the regulations enacted are actually addressing 
the current concerns of third parties.252 While many healthcare providers 
are in the process of implementing “meaningful use” regulations and new 
quality reporting requirements required by various programs under the 
ACA,253 hackers’ new methods and approaches are expanding and 
evolving at a pace that, unfortunately, cannot provide healthcare providers 
with needed time to adjust to new changes.254 Therefore, it is critical that 
such amendments have a more aggressive and expansive approach to 
addressing threats to security from outside, third-party attackers. 
Fortunately, it is not necessary for HHS or lawmakers to develop 
amendments anew, as there are already various resources available to the 
industry to help providers enhance and expand their security 
protections.255 Currently, such guidance is informational only and leaves 
the onus on healthcare providers (and perhaps, to some extent, EHR 
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vendors) to impose on themselves measures and methods more exacting 
than legally required.256 HHS has worked with the NIST to create a HIPAA 
crosswalk to NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework and through the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) to issue guidance on cybersecurity for 
medical devices.257 HHS likewise reiterated in its Fact Sheet that, while 
the HIPAA privacy and security rules help provide a base for addressing 
cybersecurity concerns, HHS encourages providers to undertake their own 
protections above and beyond those required.258 These documents provide 
advice and information to providers on best practices for cybersecurity—
these practices, at times, make recommendations beyond HIPAA 
compliance, thus exposing to providers areas in which they may remain 
vulnerable.259 Each of the publications cross-references one another and 
recommend the others as alternative sources that could be helpful for 
developing a comprehensive cybersecurity program.260 Consistent with 
recent efforts set forth under the CISA, the FDA and NIST guidance 
recommends participation in some sort of sharing forum in order to 
exchange information with other providers about existing threats.261 While 
these resources are helpful—as are several other resources available 
through HHS, such as the HHS Security Risk Assessment Tool262—the 
current approach requires providers to consult various resources and puts 
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the onus on the provider to decide which of the recommendations it should 
implement beyond HIPAA-compliance measures.263 
While such voluntary options may be helpful for purposes of not 
overwhelming or overloading those in the healthcare industry with 
additional new obligations when it comes to cybersecurity, it is not 
particularly helpful in impressing upon the industry the true necessity for 
compliance with known risks.264 It also leaves HIPAA-covered entities, 
especially those that are already struggling to make—under meaningful 
use requirements—costly investments in EHR systems, with having to 
prioritize which security regulations beyond HIPAA may be helpful, 
beneficial, or even necessary for ensuring appropriate protection of data. 
Incorporating other guidance into the HIPAA Security Rule—including 
incorporation of medical devices, data stored and exchanged on medical 
devices, and encryption of data—will provide clarity for HIPAA-covered 
entities and will ensure that EHR products on the market incorporate 
greater security provisions in order to be able to certify the product as 
HIPAA-compliant.265 
Although the CISA has many critics, it seems that the bill is at least 
a step in the right direction toward developing a more comprehensive 
approach from the healthcare community about how to address these risks 
and how to safely share such data within the confines of HIPAA.266 It is 
perhaps true that, in this world of rapidly changing and advancing 
technology and cyber threats, the healthcare industry does not have the 
luxury to wait a year for recommendations, especially in a reporting 
structure that is retrospective in nature.267 Additionally, without any 
obligation to report, it is not clear whether, even with recommendations, 
the CISA will have achieved its intended benefit.268 It is necessary, 
however, to begin somewhere and, prior to making any information 
sharing mandatory on healthcare providers, it seems advisable to explore 
appropriate processes and determine best practices for how and in what 
manner this data can safely be shared without compromising patient 
privacy concerns. It will be vital for HHS to act quickly once the task force 
has completed its work to implement any recommendations, including 
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promulgation of regulations as needed, if certain changes are deemed 
necessary, in order to assure cybersecurity in the healthcare arena. 
B. Changes to Industry Operations and Culture 
Even if certain legislative changes are made, changes to industry 
operations and culture are still needed to fully address the cybersecurity 
threats that are affecting the healthcare industry. As has been demonstrated 
by the slow adoption of EHRs following HIPAA and the continued 
challenges healthcare companies are encountering in trying to implement 
HITECH and “meaningful use” regulations,269 the healthcare industry has 
not arrived at its transition to an electronic system organically or in 
response to patient demand.270 Rather, many healthcare providers have 
adopted the use of electronic medical records reluctantly and with great 
trepidation, mostly driven by concerns about the expense and the impact 
that such use will have on practice and productivity.271 As a result, 
adoption and implementation of regulations has been challenging, in spite 
of regulations being in place since 2003.272 
The emergence and use of technology in healthcare stands in stark 
contrast to that of the banking industry, and this might give some clues as 
to why cybersecurity is so much more pronounced and established in the 
banking industry.273 “Electronic banking”274 first rose to popularity in the 
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late 1990s when both brick-and-mortar banks275 and new internet-only 
banks began offering the same services via the internet.276 Much of this 
evolution arose out of consumer demand for banking services that were 
more accessible and user friendly and did not require trips to the bank 
during banking-only hours.277 Thus, in order to compete with the 
introduction of a new competitor—the internet-only bank—brick-and-
mortar banks had to adapt and provide competing services to their 
customers, some of which have involved incentives for the consumer to 
use online resources as opposed to paper transactions.278 
Once banks began utilizing these online services, they realized the 
financial savings that would come along with such shifts to an online 
system, which motivated both consumers and banks to make the shift to 
an online platform.279 Thus, the move toward electronic banking was 
consumer driven, but banks (both brick-and-mortar and internet-only) 
soon realized the value of online banking from a cost perspective, and they 
were also motivated to continue and expand the practice.280 
Once the industry was inspired to move consumers to an online 
platform, there was equal incentive to ensure that there was sufficient 
security and privacy, not simply for compliance with the Electronic Funds 
Transfer Act (EFTA),281 the Right to Financial Privacy Act,282 and the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act,283 but because consumers who did not feel their 
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information would be secure online would be less inclined to 
participate.284 Therefore, the banking industry developed industry 
standards and methods for addressing hackers and other cyber risks in 
large part to ensure consumers would have faith and trust in an online 
banking system and would continue to use it.285 
The healthcare market, however, makes it difficult to assume that 
EHRs would have a similar trajectory to the banking industry. For 
example, unlike the banking industry, the healthcare industry has no clear 
“consumer” to drive a similar movement.286 Patients certainly stand to 
benefit from the use of EHRs through an ability to have greater interaction 
with their provider through email or online portals, greater access to health 
information, and less likelihood of duplicative services. But, the entities 
that pay for the bulk of those services—insurers and the federal 
government through its operation of federal healthcare programs—also 
stand to gain through use of EHRs, but for different and perhaps 
sometimes opposing reasons to patients.287 Regarding individual patients, 
a study conducted in 2009 concluded that 
[w]hile only 9 percent of consumers surveyed have an electronic 
personal health record [(PHR)], 42 percent are interested in 
establishing PHRs connected online to their physicians. Fifty-five 
percent want the ability to communicate with their doctor via e-mail 
to exchange health information and get answers to questions.  
Fifty-seven percent reported they’d be interested in scheduling 
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appointments, buying prescriptions and completing other 
transactions online if their information is protected.288 
Insurers and the federal government, on the other hand, are more 
concerned about the benefits for greater efficiency and patient safety, such 
as “decision support regarding the cost and selection of drugs, laboratory 
tests, and radiographic studies,”289 and reminders and prevention 
guidelines for better management of chronic conditions, all of which 
should result in lower overall costs for health services.290 There are 
multiple consumers and multiple decision makers in the healthcare 
industry having differing needs and desires in terms of the benefits of an 
EHR. This distinctive demand does not supply providers with a clear 
“product” or necessary functions for implementation and development of 
an EHR system. 
Because of this challenge of identifying and defining the consumer 
to whom the healthcare industry is catering, the push toward EHRs came 
not from consumer demand and a recognized cost savings, such as in the 
banking industry, but rather from federal regulations.291 Recognizing 
complications and flaws in the U.S. healthcare system,292 policy experts 
(who then advised U.S. Congress) first promoted the idea that improving 
the healthcare system would require a “major federal investment in 
information technology” because such technology was “essential to 
provide better care at lower cost.”293 Thus, unlike banking, EHRs arose 
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not out of competitive necessity but out of legal necessity, and therefore, 
the accompanying security and privacy approaches were adopted not to 
ensure that consumers would continue to use one’s product but merely to 
comply with applicable laws.294 This culture has permeated the slow 
adoption of EHR use and the lack of willingness to make substantial 
investments in health information technology.295 
With the use of technology being led through federal regulations, the 
consequences likewise are legislative in nature, such as the assessment of 
fines and penalties and required public reporting.296 But, unlike the 
relatively small fines and penalties that have been levied against providers 
for HIPAA violations in the past, ransomware attacks appear to be a 
possible catalyst for finally creating a cultural shift in the healthcare 
marketplace that will stress the importance of cybersecurity. 
Notwithstanding the bitcoin ransom demand, hospitals and other health 
systems that experience ransomware attacks suffer genuine financial 
consequences.297 As mentioned in the Introduction, the Baltimore-based 
MedStar system was forced to cancel many appointments at its outpatient 
facilities, and its primary hospital was eventually unable to triage patients 
sufficiently, such that it was forced to go on diversion for new patients 
arriving in the emergency room.298 The financial consequences of this type 
of attack are potentially substantial for a large system like MedStar,299 but 
could be even more devastating for a smaller system or singular hospital 
that may not have financial capital to withstand this type of attack.300 
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According to a study by the Ponemon Institute, the potential cost of 
a data breach is about $355 per patient record.301 The same study noted 
that 45% of all breaches in the study were the result of a malicious or 
criminal attack.302 What are not included in this number or in current 
calculations are the potential litigation costs that may result from patient 
safety incidents.303 To the extent that a hospital or health system is hit with 
a ransomware attack and such attack results in an issue affecting patient 
safety, such as delayed care, medication errors, surgical delays, etc., it is 
possible that patients who are harmed by such errors could file medical 
malpractice claims.304 Perhaps with the increased financial and 
reputational risks posed by ransomware attacks, the healthcare industry 
will receive a much needed nudge toward a cultural shift that begins to 
focus on the necessity for cybersecurity. Without this cultural shift 
pursuant to which the industry as a whole takes steps toward adopting a 
greater emphasis on cybersecurity, it is unlikely that changes in the law 
will bring about the necessary modifications. 
In order for this movement to take hold, it is necessary for the 
healthcare industry to move toward creating its own best practices 
regarding cybersecurity. Perhaps the task force formed under the CISA 
will be helpful in implementing this process, but the healthcare industry 
can ill afford to delay taking necessary steps much longer, as hackers and 
ransomware attackers are developing more and more sophisticated tools 
and methods.305 Unlike the slow march to adoption and use of EHRs, 
which waited for government regulators to impose restrictions and set 
standards, providers and insurers instead must move toward 
implementation of these best practices through self-regulation and lead the 
way for government regulators. Like the banking industry, players in the 
healthcare industry must take a proactive step toward assuring 
cybersecurity not because regulations require them to do so, but because 
the consequences of waiting on regulations to catch up could be potentially 
devastating to patients and also the financial well-being of the institutions 
themselves.306 
Once healthcare providers and other purchasers of EHR systems 
begin to demand more from their EHR system than simply HIPAA 
compliance, two consequences may affect the EHR vendor market. First, 
to the extent that hospitals and health systems, as consumers and 
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purchasers, demand more sophisticated and advanced cybersecurity in 
their EHR products—beyond simple compliance with the law—the 
vendors will have to provide such enhancements in order to compete in 
the market. Second, it is possible that current market consolidation will 
continue, as only EHR companies that have sufficient capabilities and 
financial resources to add these enhancements will be able to compete in 
the marketplace.307 As more consolidation occurs, and hopefully more 
interoperability among vendors as is intended to be the eventual result of 
HIPAA and HITECH, there can be more information gathering and 
sharing about the types and kinds of attacks that are happening and how 
such attacks can be prevented. To the extent that there are fewer vendors 
in the market and more vendors are able to communicate with one another 
in a HIPAA-compliant fashion, many of the concerns raised regarding 
security and privacy in connection with the CISA will be eliminated.308 
Consolidation will not eliminate ransomware attacks, but it will increase 
the capabilities of the EHR vendors to be aware of the type of attacks that 
are occurring and what steps or methods have been employed effectively 
in order to eliminate or reduce such attacks. 
CONCLUSION 
As Ryan Witt, vice president and managing director of the healthcare 
industry practice at Fortinet,309 stated, “Ransomware will get worse before 
it gets better . . . . You don’t want to think of return on investment as it 
pertains to criminal activity, but there is a strong [return on investment], 
and these attackers are quite sophisticated and know there is money to be 
made.”310 Hospitals and health systems are especially vulnerable to these 
types of attacks not only because of the critical nature of the services that 
hospitals provide, making their inability to function potentially more 
devastating, but because of a lack of updated laws that provide sufficient 
protection against the cyberattacks and a cultural attitude that has thus far 
failed to fully embrace the need for substantial and ongoing investments 
in healthcare information technology.311 
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To the extent that hospitals and health systems are going to survive 
and potentially thwart these attacks, not only do regulators need to update 
and amend existing laws to bring them up to date with current technology 
by incorporating protections that might help guard against these attacks, 
but the healthcare industry as a whole needs to shift its focus to create 
greater emphasis and energy around the importance of cybersecurity. 
Industry leaders need to develop best practices that supply providers and 
other healthcare industry participants with necessary tools not just to 
comply with laws but also to help actually prevent such attacks. This can 
be accomplished in part by also demanding better and more sophisticated 
products that incorporate more up-to-date cybersecurity provisions from 
EHR vendors. This will not necessarily be easy for healthcare providers, 
as it will require more capital investment for software updates and patches 
and better control over medical devices and how such devices interact with 
the hospital’s larger EHR.312 To the extent that providers become more 
demanding and expectant of their EHR products, this could lead to EHR 
vendor consolidation, which may in turn enable easier and safer sharing of 
necessary data regarding cyberattacks to help combat issues on a more 
prospective as opposed to retrospective basis. 
While ensuring that there are sufficient laws in place to protect 
patients and their personal health information is vital; it is simply not 
enough to believe that the healthcare industry can approach these latest 
attacks in the same way that they have approached EHR adoption 
generally. Hospitals and health systems should heed the advice of 
cybersecurity specialists such as Ed Cabrera, vice president for 
cybersecurity strategy at Trend Micro, “If these attacks make hospitals 
take a hard look at their security and take these threats seriously, in the end 
it could be a good thing. . . . This is a risk they can’t ignore anymore.”313 
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